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I. INTRODUCTION 
The courts of several natural gas-producing states have, over the 
years, adopted what is often referred to as the “marketable product rule” 
or “first marketable product doctrine” (hereinafter referred to, in all its 
various forms, as the “Marketable Product Rule” or the “Rule”).1  The 
Marketable Product Rule is a judicially crafted doctrine applied to 
natural gas royalty provisions.  The Rule requires the lessee under an oil 
and gas lease to bear all production and post-production expenses 
incurred until the gas is considered “marketable.”2  Often, the result is a 
massive shifting of post-production costs from lessors to lessees, as 
compared to the application of the same lease language in non-
Marketable Product Rule jurisdictions. 
A careful examination of the jurisprudence reveals that courts 
applying the Marketable Product Rule have failed to consider some of 
the far-reaching implications of their doctrine.  Specifically, every 
Marketable Product Rule state has at least one statute declaring the 
public policy of that jurisdiction to prohibit waste of oil and gas 
resources.  Ironically, as a direct consequence of the Marketable Product 
Rule’s shifting of post-production costs to lessees, natural gas leases 
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 1.  In their comprehensive article on the Marketable Product Rule, Keeling and Gillespie note 
that of the four states that have clearly adopted a Marketable Product Rule, no two of them articulate 
the doctrine in the same manner.  Byron C. Keeling & Karolyn King Gillespie, The First Marketable 
Product Doctrine: Just What Is the “Product”?, 37 ST. MARY’S L.J. 1, 79–80 (2005) (“The first 
marketable product doctrine has thrown oil and gas royalty law into chaos.  Four different states 
have emerged with four different versions of the first marketable product doctrine . . . .”). 
 2.  See Coulter v. Anadarko Petrol. Corp., 292 P.3d 289, 306 (Kan. 2013). 
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cease to produce in paying quantities earlier in their productive life, 
resulting in physical waste due to premature abandonment of otherwise 
recoverable natural gas reserves.  Accordingly, the Marketable Product 
Rule clearly violates the public policy of every state that has adopted it. 
II. DEVELOPMENT OF THE MARKETABLE PRODUCT RULE 
A. Pre-Marketable Product Rule Royalty Jurisprudence 
The Marketable Product Rule has its origins in the interpretation of 
common oil and gas lease language that provides for gas royalty to be 
determined “at the well.”3  Common variations call for royalty based on a 
share of the “market value” at the well,4 or the “proceeds of the sale [of 
gas] at the mouth of the well.”5  Before the 1960s, courts appeared to 
have little difficulty applying the typical variants of the royalty clause. 
Courts consistently concluded that the language meant what it said—
royalty was to be determined “at the well,” with lessors routinely bearing 
the costs of marketing their share of production.6  In fact, by the mid-
twentieth century, the issue had become so well settled that some 
commentators did not hesitate to declare unequivocally that royalty was 
to be calculated at the wellhead under all common variations of royalty 
clauses, even when the lease was silent as to location.7 
While royalty was consistently valued at the well, the method of 
determining royalty varied between clauses, depending on whether the 
lease called for royalty based on market value, market price, proceeds, or 
amount realized.  When applying a royalty clause based on market value 
or market price, courts generally defined both terms generically as “the 
price negotiated by a willing buyer, not obligated to buy, and a willing 
                                                          
 3.  See, e.g., Rogers v. Westerman Farm Co., 29 P.3d 887, 891 & n.1 (Colo. 2001); see also 
Keeling & Gillespie, supra note 1, at 12–16. 
 4.  See, e.g., TXO Prod. Corp. v. State ex rel. Comm’rs of Land Office, 903 P.2d 259, 260 
(Okla. 1994) (as amended on limited grant rehearing, with rehearing being otherwise denied).  
 5.  See, e.g., Gilmore v. Superior Oil Co., 388 P.2d 602, 605 (Kan. 1964). 
 6.  See Joseph T. Sneed, Value of Lessor’s Share of Production Where Gas Only Is Produced, 
25 TEX. L. REV. 641, 643–44 & nn.15 & 17–18 (1947) (collecting cases). 
 7.  See id. at 643–44 & n.15 (collecting cases); see also Reed v. Hackworth, 287 S.W.2d 912, 
913–14 (Ky. 1956) (“[W]here, as here, the lease is silent concerning the place of market and the 
price, the royalty should be applied to the fair market value of gas at the well.”); Scott v. Steinberger, 
213 P. 646, 647 (Kan. 1923) (where the lease simply stated that lessor was to be paid “one-eighth of 
all gas produced and marketed,” with no “at the well” language or any other indication of the 
location at which such gas was to be valued, held that royalty was to be valued at the well, with 
lessee authorized to deduct transportation costs from downstream sales price); Keeling & Gillespie, 
supra note 1, at 30–31. 
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seller, not obligated to sell, in a free and open market.”8  That definition 
tended to yield an objective standard for valuing royalty that was not 
necessarily equivalent to the price received by the lessee from the actual 
sale of production.9  By contrast, when the parties wanted to tie royalty to 
the actual sale of production by the lessee, they used a royalty clause 
based on the proceeds received, or the amount realized, by the lessee 
from the actual sale of produced gas.10  Like market price and market 
value, the terms “proceeds” and “amount realized” are generally 
synonymous.11 
Regardless of the foregoing variations, unless the royalty clause 
expressly called for royalty to be valued at some other point, early cases 
attempted to fix the appropriate value at the well.12  When a market 
existed for gas sold at the wellhead in the general vicinity of the subject 
well, courts tended to favor the “comparable sales method” for 
determining market value at the well.  Under this method, the market 
value was simply determined by comparison with other commensurate 
                                                          
 8.  Howell v. Texaco Inc., 112 P.3d 1154, 1159 (Okla. 2004) (citing Johnson v. Jernigan, 475 
P.2d 396, 398 (Okla. 1970)); Sneed, supra note 6, at 645; cf. Decker Coal Co. v. Dep’t of Revenue 
of Montana, 2 P.3d 245, 250 (Mont. 2000) (in the context of coal sales, “[t]he term ‘market 
value’ . . . means the price that a willing buyer would pay to a willing seller under the market and 
economic conditions at the time of the sale.”).  Although determining market value can yield a 
heated debate, the definition of the term has not been substantially affected by the Marketable 
Product Rule.  See, e.g., Howell, 112 P.3d at 1159 (applying the same definition in 2004, after 
Oklahoma became a Marketable Product Rule state, as had been used over thirty years earlier in 
Jernigan).  Furthermore, as a general proposition, no meaningful distinction was recognized between 
market value and its common royalty clause permutation, market price.  See Sneed, supra note 6, at 
652–54 (stating that there is no difference between the market value and the market price of gas); see 
also Arkansas Natural Gas Co. v. Sartor, 78 F.2d 924, 927 (5th Cir. 1935) (stating that the terms 
“market price” and “market value” are interchangeable).  But see Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. 
Coffee, 140 F.2d 409, 410–11 (5th Cir. 1944) (distinguishing prior Fifth Circuit precedent and 
attempting to articulate a difference between “market price” and “market value”).  The Shamrock 
case appears to be at odds with the conclusions of other commentators on this point.  See, e.g., Atl. 
Richfield Co. v. Farm Credit Bank of Wichita, 226 F.3d 1138, 1166 & n.14 (10th Cir. 2000) 
(quoting 3 EUGENE KUNTZ, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF OIL AND GAS § 40.4 (1989) (noting the 
apparent disagreement with the Shamrock case)); Sneed, supra note 6, at 652–53. 
 9.  See Texas Oil & Gas Corp. v. Vela, 429 S.W.2d 866, 871 (Tex. 1968) (reviewing older 
cases); see also Shamrock, 140 F.2d 409.  See generally Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Bynum, 155 F.2d 
196 (5th Cir. 1946) (ignoring actual sales price of gas and looking to objective evidence of market 
price in surrounding field to determine royalty under clause based on market price at the well). 
 10.  See Vela, 429 S.W.2d at 871. 
 11.  Tana Oil & Gas Corp. v. Cernosek, 188 S.W.3d 354, 360 (Tex. App. 2006) (collecting 
cases); see also 8 PATRICK H. MARTIN & BRUCE M. KRAMER, WILLIAMS & MEYERS OIL AND GAS 
LAW 45, 87 (2009) (stating that “amount realized” is synonymous with “proceeds”). 
 12.  See supra note 7 and accompanying text; Keeling & Gillespie, supra note 1, at 31 (“The 
general rule establishing that a lessee could properly calculate its royalty payments at the wellhead 
was ‘a well recognized, basic concept of oil and gas law for many decades . . . .’” (quoting Scott 
Lansdown, The Marketable Condition Rule, 44 S. TEX. L. REV. 667, 672 (2003))). 
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sales in the relevant geographical area.13  When no comparable market 
existed, or the lessee sold gas off the premises under a proceeds or 
amount realized royalty clause, courts generally approved the “work-
back method” of calculating the market value or proceeds at the 
wellhead.  Under the work-back method all costs incurred to move and 
process the gas from the wellhead to the point of sale were deducted 
from the actual sales price at such point, thereby arriving at a 
mathematical determination of value or proceeds at the well.14 
The work-back method recognizes the marketplace realities 
associated with the production of any commodity—as the product is 
transformed from its raw form to a finished product, its value increases; 
and as that same product is transported from its place of origin or 
manufacture to its final destination for consumption or other use, its 
value is likewise enhanced.15  That justification for the work-back 
method has been expressly cited by a number of courts that approve of 
its application.16  Additionally, courts applying the work-back method 
have specifically relied on “at the well” language in the underlying lease 
to explain why post-production costs should be deducted.17  If royalty is 
to be determined at the well, then lessor and lessee appropriately share 
all reasonable costs incurred beyond the wellhead, since both benefit 
                                                          
 13.  See, e.g., Vela, 429 S.W.2d at 872; Reed v. Hackworth, 287 S.W.2d 912, 914 (Ky. 1956); 
Bynum, 155 F.2d at 198 (“The question, therefore, is . . . whether or not there have been recent, 
substantial, and comparable sales of like gas . . . .”); Shamrock, 140 F.2d at 411 (articulating 
comparable sales method without using that label); Wall v. United Gas Pub. Serv. Co., 152 So. 561, 
565 (La. 1934); see also Keeling & Gillespie, supra note 1, at 31–32. 
 14.  See, e.g., Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Phillips Petrol. Co., 554 F.2d 381, 387–88 (10th Cir. 1975); 
Freeland v. Sun Oil Co., 277 F.2d 154, 159 (5th Cir. 1960); Wall, 152 So. at 564 (noting that the trial 
court’s deduction of post-production costs from sales price to calculate value at the wellhead would 
have been correct in absence of an actual market at the well); Scott v. Steinberger, 213 P. 646, 647–
48 (Kan. 1923) (approving the trial court’s application of the work-back method to determine value 
at the well); see also Keeling & Gillespie, supra note 1, at 32. 
 15.  David E. Pierce, Exploring the Origins of Royalty Disputes, 23 PETROLEUM ACCT. & FIN. 
MGMT. J. 72, 77–78 (2004) (describing this phenomena as the “Linear Enhancement of Production 
Value”).  In fact, the work-back method probably overstates the value of production at the wellhead 
because it subtracts from the sales price only those actual expenses incurred from the well to the 
point of sale when the actual enhancement of value between those two points exceeds those costs; 
were it not so, there would be no profit motive to prompt the lessee to incur the added risk and 
expense to move the production to market.  See Keeling & Gillespie, supra note 1, at 33 & n.128 
(collecting articles). 
 16.  See Poplar Creek Dev. Co. v. Chesapeake Appalachia, L.L.C., 636 F.3d 235, 244 (6th Cir. 
2011); Piney Woods Country Life Sch. v. Shell Oil Co., 726 F.2d 225, 240 (5th Cir. 1984); Merritt 
v. Sw. Electr. Power Co., 499 So. 2d 210, 213–14 (La. Ct. App. 1986); Schroeder v. Terra Energy, 
Ltd., 565 N.W.2d 887, 894 (Mich. Ct. App. 1997); Creson v. Amoco Prod. Co., 10 P.3d 853, 858–59 
(N.M. Ct. App. 2000). 
 17.  See supra note 16 and accompanying text. 
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from the enhanced value created by post-production processing and 
transportation to a more distant market. 
B. Cases Articulating and Adopting the Marketable Product Rule 
Despite the clarity originally perceived by earlier courts in “at the 
well” language, starting in the 1960s, a number of courts began to 
express confusion over what “at the well” language meant, and how it 
should be applied. 
1. Kansas 
In 1964, the Kansas Supreme Court handed down a pair of cases that 
established what was to ultimately become the Marketable Product Rule 
as the law of Kansas.18  The first of these cases was Gilmore v. Superior 
Oil Co.19  After a number of years venting casinghead gas from oil wells, 
the lessee in Gilmore installed a compressor on the Gilmore lease and 
sought to deduct the lessors’ share of compression costs from the 
royalty.20  The lessors objected and filed suit.21  Where gas was produced 
and sold, the relevant portion of the lease’s royalty clause provided for 
royalty on “the proceeds of the sale [of gas] at the mouth of the well.”22 
                                                          
 18.  A few years before Kansas adopted the Marketable Product Rule, the United States Court 
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit issued a similar ruling in California Co. v. Udall, 296 
F.2d 384 (D.C. Cir. 1961).  However, the holding in the federal case was predicated on certain 
federal regulations implementing the Mineral Leasing Act, 30 U.S.C. §§ 181–287 (2012), which 
required the lessee under a federal oil and gas lease to market the gas.  California Co., 296 F.2d at 
386–87.  The Secretary of the Interior argued that the duty to market imposed by the regulations 
required the lessee to bear all costs of producing a marketable product, and the court agreed.  Id. at 
387–88.  Since this case turned on federal statutes and regulations, rather than the plain language of 
the underlying lease, it provides no basis of support for the state cases adopting the Marketable 
Product Rule.  
 19.  388 P.2d 602 (Kan. 1964).  The second case was Schupbach v. Cont’l Oil Co., 394 P.2d 1 
(Kan. 1964).  The relevant facts of both Gilmore and Shupbach were essentially the same, as were 
several of the plaintiffs.  See id.; see also supra note 5 and accompanying text.  The court concluded 
as much and held that Gilmore controlled the outcome in Shupbach.  Shupbach, 394 P.2d 1.  
Therefore Shupbach need not be separately discussed in the body of the text.  However, one 
noteworthy distinction between these two cases is that Justice John Fontron, who was appointed to 
the Kansas Supreme Court after Gilmore was issued, entered a concurring opinion in Shupbach in 
which he said Gilmore “offends my sence [sic] of logic,” and argued that the “at the well” language 
should be given its plain meaning, with lessors bearing their proportionate share of post-production 
costs.  Id. at 7 (Fontron, J., concurring).  Nevertheless, Justice Fontron concurred in Shupbach 
because Gilmore had already decided the issue.  Id.  
 20.  Gilmore, 388 P.2d at 604. 
 21.  Id. 
 22.  Id. at 605. 
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With no meaningful analysis whatsoever, and no explanation of why 
Kansas would depart from all previous state appellate courts to consider 
similar language (including prior Kansas precedent),23 the Gilmore court 
summarily concluded that the lease’s language was ambiguous, and 
should thus be construed against the lessee.24  The court then promptly 
turned to implied covenant law (an area of oil and gas law that is largely 
irrelevant when construing express lease provisions),25 and in particular 
the work of Professor Maurice Merrill, to articulate the essence of the 
Marketable Product Rule—under the implied covenant to market, the 
lessee must bear all expenses incurred to place the gas in marketable 
condition.26 
Gilmore marked a sharp departure from Kansas law as articulated in 
Matzen v. Hugoton Production Co.27 just a few years earlier.  Gilmore 
attempted to marginalize Matzen’s statements regarding deductibility of 
post-production costs on the alleged basis that the parties therein had 
“stipulated” to the deductibility of post-production costs.28  However, a 
review of Matzen shows no mention that the parties “stipulated” to 
anything of the sort; rather, it appears that all of the parties simply 
recognized the well-established principle that post-production costs were 
in fact deductible, and they were merely contesting the proper method of 
applying the deductions to determine royalty.29  Indeed, a fair reading of 
                                                          
 23.  See Matzen v. Hugoton Prod. Co., 321 P.2d 576, 583 (Kan. 1958) (where royalty was to be 
determined at the wellhead, post-production costs incurred from wellhead to point of sale were 
deductible); Molter v. Lewis, 134 P.2d 404, 406 (Kan. 1943) (“It is the duty of the lessee to see that 
the oil is marketed, but this general duty does not mean that the lessee must pay the transportation 
charge of the less[or]’s share of the oil from the well to some distant place.”); Voshell v. Indian Terr. 
Illum. Oil Co., 19 P.2d 456, 457–58 (Kan. 1933) (where royalty was to be delivered in kind at the 
well, and no market existed at the well, royalty was to be based on sale at distant location less 
transportation charges incurred from well to point of sale); Scott v. Steinberger, 213 P. 646, 647–48 
(Kan. 1923) (even in absence of “at the well” language, royalty to be valued at the wellhead, not at 
point of sale).  Gilmore did note the Kansas Supreme Court’s earlier decision in Matzen; however, 
the Gilmore court merely observed that, in spite of the fact that all parties had relied on Matzen, that 
case was irrelevant because the parties had stipulated to the key issue of deductibility of post-
production costs.  Gilmore, 388 P.2d at 605.  But see infra notes 27–31 and accompanying text. 
 24.  See Gilmore, 388 P.2d at 605.  Interestingly, in Waechter v. Amoco Prod. Co., the Kansas 
Supreme Court looked at materially identical language providing for royalty based on proceeds of a 
sale “at the well,” and concluded that it was clear and unambiguous.  537 P.2d 228, 249 (Kan. 1975).  
How is it that the same language could be ambiguous in 1964, but clear and unambiguous in 1975?  
Did the Marketable Product Rule remove the ambiguity?  Probably not, inasmuch as Waechter failed 
to even mention Gilmore, Shupbach, or the Marketable Product Rule.   
 25.  See infra note 113 and accompanying text. 
 26.  See Gilmore, 388 P.2d at 606–07. 
 27.  321 P.2d 576 (Kan. 1958). 
 28.  Gilmore, 388 P.2d at 605. 
 29.  See Matzen, 321 P.2d at 580–81. 
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Matzen makes clear that the Kansas Supreme Court did not merely rely 
on the parties’ general agreement that the lessee could deduct post-
production costs.  Instead, the Matzen court broadly declared that in a 
proceeds-type gas royalty clause: 
where, as here, the gas produced is transported by the lessee in its 
gathering system off the premises and processed and sold, its royalty 
obligation is determined by deducting from gross proceeds reasonable 
expenses relating directly to the costs and charges of gathering, 
processing and marketing the gas.  Thus, proceeds from the sale of gas, 
wherever and however ultimately sold, is the measure of plaintiffs’ 
royalty, less reasonable expenses incurred in its gathering, transporting, 
processing and marketing.30 
Contrary to Gilmore’s assertion, there is nothing in Matzen that even 
hints that this sweeping statement was based on any stipulation between 
the parties.  In fact, it would have been ridiculous to make such a broad 
pronouncement of Kansas law if the court had been relying on a 
stipulation that it believed was questionable.  Rather, this pronouncement 
was made against the backdrop of a host of other cases from Kansas and 
elsewhere, and accurately presented the state of the law with respect to 
deductibility of post-production costs at the time it was written.31  
Gilmore’s attempt to diminish the significance of its departure from 
Matzen is unconvincing. 
The poor analysis and reasoning in Gilmore might be explained as 
much by the court’s reliance on Professor Merrill’s scholarship as 
anything else.  Professor Merrill was a staunch advocate of the notion 
that implied covenants in oil and gas leases are implied in law, rather 
than implied in fact.32  When covenants are implied in law, the text of the 
lease is largely irrelevant because the parties cannot contract around such 
covenants.33  Thus, the Gilmore court, if proceeding under an implied-in-
law analysis, would have had no need to consider the text of the lease.  
Nevertheless, the reasoning in Gilmore proceeded from an initial, albeit 
perfunctory, conclusion that the “proceeds . . . at the mouth of the well” 
language was ambiguous.34  In any event, to the extent Gilmore might 
                                                          
 30.  Id. at 582. 
 31.  See generally id. at 581–82. 
 32.  See Smith v. Amoco Prod. Co., 31 P.3d 255, 268 (Kan. 2001) (“Professor Merrill is the 
advocate for the implied in law approach.” (citing  MERRILL, THE LAW RELATING TO COVENANTS 
IMPLIED IN OIL AND GAS LEASES § 220 (2d ed.1940)). 
 33.  See Mercury Inv. Co. v. F.W. Woolworth Co., 706 P.2d 523, 529 n.14 (Okla. 1985). 
 34.  Gilmore v. Superior Oil Co., 388 P.2d 602, 605. 
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have been an initial foray into the world of covenants implied in law, it 
has been overruled because the Kansas Supreme Court subsequently 
held, in unequivocal language, that implied covenants under Kansas law 
are implied in fact, and therefore arise, if at all, after a thorough 
examination of the express terms of the lease.35 
In more recent years, Kansas has reaffirmed its adherence to the 
Marketable Product Rule.  In Sternberger v. Marathon Oil Co.,36 the 
Kansas Supreme Court stated that the rule in Kansas was the same as that 
articulated by the Colorado Supreme Court in Garman v. Conoco, Inc.37 
(discussed infra Part II.B.3): 
Once a marketable product is obtained, reasonable costs incurred to 
transport or enhance the value of the marketable gas may be charged 
against nonworking interest owners.  The lessee has the burden of 
proving the reasonableness of the costs.  Absent a contract providing to 
the contrary, a nonworking interest owner is not obligated to bear any 
share of production expense, such as compressing, transporting, and 
processing, undertaken to transform gas into a marketable product.38 
Then, in Coulter v. Anadarko Petroleum Corp.,39 the Kansas 
Supreme Court noted Colorado’s intervening decision in Rogers v. 
Westerman Farm Co.40 (discussed infra Part II.B.3), which criticized 
Sternberger for concluding that gas could be marketable at the well when 
there was no actual commercial market at that location.41  Expressing 
some continued reverence for Colorado’s expansion of the lessee’s 
burdens under the evolving Marketable Product Rule, the Coulter court 
observed that “[u]nder [Rogers], Sternberger’s holding that gas can be in 
marketable condition at a point at which no market exists may be 
                                                          
 35.  See Smith, 31 P.3d at 268 (“The Indian Territory court observed in 1941 that it had found 
no support for Professor Merrill’s implied in law doctrine in the adjudicated cases.  Sixty years later, 
based on the briefing here, we share the same observation.  We choose to join Oklahoma, Texas, and 
Montana in holding that the covenants are implied in fact.” (citation omitted)).  But see Fawcett v. 
Oil Producers, Inc. of Kan., 306 P.3d 318, 325 (Kan. Ct. App. 2013) (relying on Farrar to perpetuate 
the notion that Kansas has reversed course and treats the covenants as implied in law); Farrar v. 
Mobil Oil Corp., 234 P.3d 19, 29–30 (Kan. Ct. App. 2010) (disregarding the clear holding of Smith 
by trying to limit its broad conclusion that implied covenants are implied in fact).  For a more 
detailed analysis of the flawed reasoning in Farrar, see John W. Broomes et al., Oil, Gas, and 
Mineral Law, in 2011 KAN. ANN. SURV. 273–75 (Kan. Bar Assoc. 2011).  
 36.  894 P.2d 788 (Kan. 1995). 
 37.  886 P.2d 652 (Colo. 1994). 
 38.  Sternberger, 894 P.2d at 800. 
 39.  292 P.3d 289 (Kan. 2013). 
 40.  29 P.3d 887 (Colo. 2001). 
 41.  See Coulter, 292 P.3d at 306 (citing Rogers, 29 P.3d at 896–902). 
BROOMES_FINAL_PUBLICATIONREADY.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 11/11/2014  9:51 AM 
2014] WASTE NOT, WANT NOT 157 
questionable.”42  Accordingly, it appears that Kansas may be prepared to 
follow Colorado’s lead in future Marketable Product Rule cases, which, 
as described in more detail in Part II.B.3, represents one of the most 
extreme views of the Rule in the United States. 
2. Oklahoma 
For almost thirty years, Kansas was the lone state to embrace the 
Marketable Product Rule.  Then, in 1992, Oklahoma broke from its prior 
precedent and adopted its own version of the Marketable Product Rule in 
Wood v. TXO Prod. Corp.43  As early as 1936, the state and federal 
courts in Oklahoma interpreted “at the well” language in gas royalty 
clauses in accordance with the plain language of that phrase.44  In 
Katschor v. Eason Oil Co.,45 the lessee processed casinghead gas through 
a gasoline plant to extract liquid hydrocarbons.46  Lessors sued claiming, 
among other things, that the gasoline content of the gas had been 
improperly measured, thereby resulting in loss of royalties.47 
The relevant portion of the lease’s royalty clause provided, “The 
lessee shall pay to lessor for gas produced from any oil well and used by 
the lessee for the manufacture of gasoline or any other product, as 
royalty, one-eighth of the market value of such gas.”48  Although the 
lease was silent regarding the location for determining royalty, the 
landowners contended that royalty was payable on the value of the gas 
“at the mouth of the well.”49  Since no market existed at the well, the 
Oklahoma Supreme Court concluded that the lessors were entitled to 
establish the market value at the well: 
by the only available means, namely, by showing the sale price of the 
gasoline and the residue gas and deducting from the sum thereof the 
cost of manufacture of the gas after production, plus depletion of the 
plant and cost of marketing the gasoline and residue gas.50 
                                                          
 42.  Id. at 306. 
 43.  854 P.2d 880 (Okla. 1992). 
 44.  See Katschor v. Eason Oil Co., 63 P.2d 977 (Okla. 1936). 
 45.  Id. 
 46.  See id. at 978. 
 47.  See id. at 979. 
 48.  Id. at 981. 
 49.  Id. at 981 (Okla. 1936).   
 50.  Id. 
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This approval of the work-back method of calculating market value 
at the well clearly provides for deduction of all post-production costs, 
including marketing costs and that part of the casinghead gas 
“deplet[ed]”51 (which, based on the context, presumably means the gas 
consumed in the manufacturing process).52  Nevertheless, the 
precedential value of this statement was unclear at the time because the 
landowners did not contend for a more favorable interpretation of the 
royalty clause. 
Four years later, in Cimarron Utilities Co. v. Safranko, the 
Oklahoma Supreme Court noted with approval that its holding in 
Katschor regarding the work-back method was in accord with the rule in 
other jurisdictions.53  The court went on to describe the holding in 
Katschor as establishing that “market value is synonymous with actual 
value, and may be proved by showing the selling price less the expense 
of marketing the commodity.”54  Thus, it appeared once again that all 
reasonable post-production expenses could be deducted to arrive at a 
proper determination of market value at the well.  Moreover, like the 
royalty provision in Katschor, the lease at issue in Safranko was silent 
regarding the location for determining value; yet, the parties and the 
court all seemed to assume that the only logical place for determining 
value was at the wellhead.55  Nevertheless, the statement regarding the 
Katschor holding was arguably dictum because the real dispute in 
Safranko was whether the work-back method was the exclusive method 
for determining market value at the well when gas was sold off the 
premises, or whether some form of comparable sales method could be 
employed.56 
To the extent that the statements from Katschor and Safranko 
regarding deductibility of post-production costs under Oklahoma law 
were dicta, the issue appeared to move toward settled law in Harding v. 
Cameron, a federal case out of the Western District of Oklahoma.57  The 
lessee in Harding constructed a compressor station to market low-
                                                          
 51.  Id. 
 52.  The more common term for this phenomena is “gas shrinkage,” which reflects the volume 
of gas lost or absorbed in the process of extracting liquids therefrom.  See MARTIN & KRAMER, 
supra note 11, at 431.   
 53.  101 P.2d 258, 260 (Okla. 1940). 
 54.  Id. 
 55.  See id. at 259–60. 
 56.  See generally id. at 259–61. 
 57.  220 F. Supp. 466 (W.D. Okla. 1963).  
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pressure casinghead gas;58 however, the lessee, under a lease providing 
for royalty based on value or proceeds at the well,59 calculated royalty 
using its own determination of the market value of the gas based, at least 
in part, on gas purchase contracts the lessee had entered into with other 
non-operating working interest owners in the relevant leases.60  The 
district court rejected the lessee’s methodology, finding instead that no 
market existed at the wells.61  Relying on Katschor, Safranko, and 
several Kansas cases, the Harding court stated, in no uncertain terms, 
that: 
[t]he rule in Oklahoma fixing the “value,” or “market price,” of gas at 
the wellhead and processed by lessee through a compressor plant 
constructed by it is the gross price which the lessee receives from the 
purchaser less the actual cost of compression and reasonable 
depreciation on its compressor plant.62 
Thus, according to Harding, even compression costs necessary to market 
gas (a favorite target of Marketable Product Rule cases) were deductible 
when calculating royalty based on market value at the well.63 
Things appeared to get even worse for lessors seeking to avoid 
sharing in post-production costs when the Oklahoma Supreme Court 
handed down its decision in Johnson v. Jernigan.64  In Jernigan, lessors 
sued over the lessee’s deduction of a proportionate share of marketing 
and transportation costs incurred to move the gas some ten miles to the 
point of sale.65  The royalty clause at issue provided for gas royalty of 
“the equal one eight [sic] (1/8) of the gross proceeds at the prevailing 
market rate for all gas sold off the premises.”66  Based on use of the term 
“gross proceeds” in the royalty clause, the lessors contended that no 
deductions for marketing and transportation costs were permitted under 
the lease.67 
                                                          
 58.  Id. at 467–68. 
 59.  Id. at 467. 
 60.  Id. at 468–70. 
 61.  Id. at 470. 
 62.  Id. at 471. 
 63.  Harding v. Cameron, 220 F. Supp. 466, 471 (W.D. Okla. 1963).  See, e.g., Gilmore v. 
Superior Oil Co., 388 P.2d 602, 604 (Kan. 1964); Shupbach v. Cont’l Oil Co., 394 P.2d 1, 2 (Kan. 
1964); Wood v. TXO Prod. Corp., 854 P.2d 880, 880–81 (Okla. 1992).  
 64.  475 P.2d 396 (Okla. 1970). 
 65.  See id. at 397. 
 66.  Id. 
 67.  Id. at 399. 
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In what must have seemed like the death knell for post-production 
cost battles in Oklahoma, the court concluded that the lessee’s 
obligations essentially ended at the lease boundary.68  At least with 
respect to costs for gathering, transporting, or otherwise piping the gas to 
the point of sale, even under a clause providing for royalty on “gross 
proceeds,” the lessee was entitled to deduct all costs from the lease to the 
point of sale.69  The Jernigan court defended its holding with a number 
of cases from other jurisdictions, including a case from the Western 
District of Louisiana, in which the Louisiana court characterized the 
deductibility of post-production costs to determine market value at the 
well as “nothing but common sense and simple justice.”70 
By 1992, however, “simple justice” had become a little too simple 
for Oklahoma.  In Wood v. TXO Prod. Corp., the Oklahoma Supreme 
Court was presented with the following certified question: “Is an oil and 
gas lessee/operator who is obligated to pay the lessor ‘3/16 at the market 
price at the well for the gas sold’, entitled to deduct the cost of gas 
compression from the lessor’s royalty interest?”71  Relying heavily on the 
fact that the compressors were located on the leased premises, and that 
the gas was sold on the leased premises, the court marginalized Jernigan 
as only applicable to off-lease transportation costs, and dispensed with 
Harding in a footnote as applying only to casinghead gas in a work-back 
analysis.72 
Having cleared the field of any relevant Oklahoma precedent, the 
Wood court observed an even split between Texas and Louisiana, on the 
one hand, which allowed the lessee to deduct the lessor’s share of post-
production costs from royalty, and Kansas and Arkansas, on the other, 
which purportedly did not allow such deductions.73  In a 4-to-3 decision, 
the Wood court adopted a Marketable Product Rule approach.74  
                                                          
 68.  See id. 
 69.  Id.  If a “gross proceeds” royalty clause allows deduction for all marketing and 
transportation costs beyond the lease boundaries, what distinction arises when the royalty is based on 
“net proceeds”?  In its conclusion, the court appeared to suggest that charges for the “care and 
preparation” of gas might be beyond the scope of the holding in Jernigan.  See id. at 400 (citing 
Clark v. Slick Oil Co., 211 P. 496 (Okla. 1922)). 
 70.  Johnson v. Jernigan, 475 P.2d 396, 399 (Okla. 1970) (quoting Hemler v. Union Producing 
Co., 40 F. Supp. 824, 832 (W.D. La. 1941), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 134 F.2d 436 (5th Cir. 
1943)). 
 71.  Wood v. TXO Prod. Corp., 854 P.2d 880 (Okla. 1992).  
 72.  Id. at 880–82 & n.1. 
 73.  Id. at 881–82. 
 74.  See id. at 883. 
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Answering the certified question “in the negative,”75 the Oklahoma 
Supreme Court said that the implied duty to market includes “the cost of 
preparing the gas for market,”76 and “obtaining a marketable product.”77 
Wood suffered from a number of infirmities.  First, while the court 
appeared to begin its analysis by shoe-horning the case into the crack left 
by Harding and Jernigan with respect to on-lease compression and on-
lease sales, the certified question was cast in much broader terms, as was 
the Wood court’s answer: “We find that in Oklahoma the lessee’s duty to 
market involves obtaining a marketable product.”78  Moreover, the court 
appeared to go out of its way to both diminish the significance of prior 
Oklahoma precedent and to present the appearance that other 
jurisdictions were evenly split on the question, thereby allowing the 
Oklahoma Supreme Court to write its Marketable Product Rule 
jurisprudence on a clean slate.  In doing so, the Wood court failed to 
mention that, in addition to Texas and Louisiana, a number of other 
jurisdictions had already settled the issue in favor of allowing lessees to 
deduct post-production costs from royalties.79  In addition, Wood’s 
reliance on Arkansas as a Marketable Product Rule state was misplaced. 
Wood relied on Hanna Oil & Gas Co. v. Taylor,80 in which the 
Arkansas Supreme Court held that a royalty clause based on 
“proceeds . . . at the well” meant “total proceeds,” with no deduction for 
compression costs, where the lease made no reference to “net” proceeds 
or otherwise expressly discussed deduction of post-production costs.81  
Hanna made no pronouncements about implied covenants, lessees’ 
duties, or any other variation on the typical Marketable Product Rule 
analysis.82  Instead, Hanna was simply a case interpreting express lease 
terms to decide whether the unqualified use of the term “proceeds” 
meant gross (or total) proceeds, or net proceeds.83  Based on the express 
lease language and the interpretation thereof by the parties’ prior 
                                                          
 75.  Id.  
 76.  Id. at 882. 
 77.  Id. at 883. 
 78.  Id. 
 79.  See, e.g., Piney Woods Country Life Sch. v. Shell Oil Co., 726 F.2d 225, 240 (5th Cir. 
1984) (applying Mississippi law); Kretni Dev. Co. v. Consol. Oil Corp., 74 F.2d 497, 499–500 (10th 
Cir. 1934) (applying Wyoming law); Atl. Richfield Co. v. California, 262 Cal. Rptr. 683, 688 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 1989); Reed v. Hackworth, 287 S.W.2d 912, 914 (Ky. 1956). 
 80.  Wood v. TXO Prod. Corp., 854 P.2d 880, 881–85 (Okla. 1992). 
 81.  Hanna Oil & Gas Co. v. Taylor, 759 S.W.2d 563, 564–65 (Ark. 1988). 
 82.  See id.  
 83.  Id. 
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conduct,84 the Hanna court concluded that, in this case, “proceeds” 
meant gross proceeds.85  Indeed, despite Oklahoma’s enthusiastic desire 
to count Arkansas among the Marketable Product Rule states, even a 
recent federal district court case out of Arkansas observed that the issue 
is far from settled.86 
Apparently eager to brandish its newly minted Marketable Product 
Rule, over the next few years the Oklahoma Supreme Court took two 
more post-production cost cases that could have been decided without 
any reference to the Marketable Product Rule, and used them to affirm 
and refine the Rule’s place in Oklahoma jurisprudence.87  The first of 
these cases was TXO Prod. Corp. v. State ex rel. Comm’rs of Land Office 
(hereinafter CLO),88 where the dispute centered on a royalty clause that 
required the lessee: 
to deliver or cause to be delivered to the [lessor], without cost into 
pipelines, a royalty of one-eighth (1/8) part of the oil or gas produced 
from the leased premises and a one-eighth (1/8) part of all casinghead 
or drip gas or gasoline or other hydrocarbon substances produced from 
any well or wells on said premises, or in lieu thereof, pay to lessor the 
market value thereof, as the Commissioners may elect.89 
The dispute in CLO centered on whether the lessee could deduct the 
lessor’s share of post-production costs for compression, dehydration, and 
gathering,90 all of which occurred prior to delivery into the purchaser’s 
pipeline.91  This royalty provision contained no “at the well” language.92  
Instead, the provision merely provided for delivery of the royalty share in 
kind “without cost into the pipelines,” or payment of “the market value 
thereof.”93  The court’s analysis of this clause could have begun and 
                                                          
 84.  See id. at 565 (noting that for over two years, the lessee had paid royalties with no 
deduction for compression costs). 
 85.  See id. at 564.  
 86.  See Riedel v. XTO Energy, Inc., 257 F.R.D. 494, 503 (E.D. Ark. 2009); see also Edward B. 
Poitevent, II, Post-Production Deductions from Royalty, 44 S. TEX. L. REV. 709, 747 (2003) (noting 
that “Oklahoma is doing its best to pull Arkansas onto the marketable product side by citing its 
decisions.  However, it appears that Arkansas is still reluctant to commit.”).  
 87.  See Mittlestaedt v. Santa Fe Minerals, 954 P.2d 1203 (Okla. 1998); TXO Prod. Corp. v. 
State ex rel. Comm’rs of Land Office, 903 P.2d 259 (Okla. 1994).  
 88.  903 P.2d 259 (Okla. 1994). 
 89.  Id. at 260 (emphasis added). 
 90.  Id. 
 91.  See id. at 262. 
 92.  See id. at 260.  
 93.  Id.  
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ended with the text of the lease itself.  The lease called for payment of 
royalty on “the market value thereof,”94 which simply prompts the 
question, “thereof what?”  The answer is easily found in the lease itself a 
few lines earlier, where the in-kind royalty is defined as a share of the 
gas delivered “without cost into pipelines.”95  Thus, the CLO court could 
have simply decided the case on the express terms of the lease’s royalty 
provision by concluding that this particular royalty clause defined the 
lessor’s royalty as the market value of one-eighth of the gas delivered 
free of cost into the purchaser’s pipelines, and because all the disputed 
costs were incurred prior to delivery into the pipeline, the express terms 
of the lease prohibited the lessee from deducting such costs from the 
lessor’s royalty. 
Rather than decide the case on such a narrow basis, the CLO court 
made tacit acknowledgment of the express terms of the lease,96 but spent 
the bulk of its opinion deciding the case under the Marketable Product 
Rule.97  In doing so, the court expanded the scope of Oklahoma’s 
Marketable Product Rule to preclude deduction of not only the 
compression costs excluded in Wood, but also gathering and dehydration 
costs.98 
The Oklahoma Supreme Court followed a similar pattern in 
Mittelstaedt v. Santa Fe Minerals, Inc.,99 in response to a certified 
question from the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.  
The specific question presented by the Tenth Circuit in Mittelstaedt was 
whether, under the facts of the case, “an oil and gas lessee who is 
obligated to pay ‘3/16 of the gross proceeds received for the gas sold’ 
[was] entitled to deduct a proportional share of transportation, 
compression, dehydration, and blending costs from the royalty interest 
paid to the lessor?”100 
As in CLO, the lease language was devoid of any specification that 
royalty was to be valued at the well.101  Instead, royalty was simply based 
                                                          
 94.  TXO Prod. Corp. v. State ex rel. Comm’rs of Land Office, 903 P.2d 259, 260 (Okla. 1994). 
 95.  Id. 
 96.  See id. at 260–61. 
 97.  See id. at 261–63. 
 98.  Id. at 263. 
 99.  954 P.2d 1203 (Okla. 1998). 
 100.  Id. at 1204–05. 
 101.  Id.  The Mittelstaedt opinion also referred to another royalty provision in the lease as 
follows:  
The third clause discussed by the parties provides that the lessee will ‘pay 
lessor for gas produced from any oil well and used off the premises, or for the 
 
BROOMES_FINAL_PUBLICATIONREADY.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 11/11/2014  9:51 AM 
164 KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 63 
on “the gross proceeds received for the gas sold,” regardless of where the 
sale took place.102  Had Oklahoma been writing on a clean slate while 
interpreting gross proceeds royalty clauses, the Mittelstaedt court might 
have been able to rely on its old favorite from Arkansas, Hanna Oil & 
Gas Co. v. Taylor, for a plain-language interpretation of a gross proceeds 
provision, and thereby avoided the Marketable Product Rule issue 
altogether.103  However, Oklahoma had not yet discarded the Jernigan 
case, which held that a gross-proceeds royalty clause still allowed 
deductions for post-production costs incurred beyond the leased 
premises.104 
The Marketable Product Rule proved to be the Mittelstaedt court’s 
tool of choice to fix this conundrum.  Rather than correcting Jernigan’s 
error of ignoring the plain text of the lease and simply holding that an 
unqualified royalty provision calling for royalty on the “gross proceeds 
received for the gas sold” means what it says—royalty on sales price 
with no deductions or net-back to the well—Mittelstaedt continued the 
woeful practice of elevating implied covenants over express lease 
terms.105  In this case, the Marketable Product Rule took over at the lease 
boundary, where Jernigan’s gross-proceeds rule stopped,106 and once 
again required the lessee to bear all costs of producing a “marketable 
product.”107  Mittelstaedt went even further to conclude that, even after a 
marketable product was obtained, the lessee could only deduct post-
production costs “when the costs are reasonable, when actual royalty 
revenues increase in proportion to the costs assessed against the royalty 
interest, when the costs are associated with transforming an already 
                                                          
manufacture of casing-head gasoline or dry commercial gas, 3/16 of the gross 
proceeds, at the mouth of the well, received by lessee for the gas . . . .”   
Id. at 1206 (emphasis added).  The court used this provision as a springboard to launch into its 
application of the implied covenant to market and the Marketable Product Rule; however, that 
particular lease provision was not the one raised by the Tenth Circuit in its certified question, and 
was therefore not relevant to the case.  See id.  All indications are that the applicable royalty 
language was that quoted by the Tenth Circuit in its certified question.  See id.  Accordingly, it 
appears that the Mittelstaedt court decided to pivot—the court decided not to answer the question 
presented by the Tenth Circuit, but instead answered a different question that was, for some reason, 
more to its liking.   
 102.  Id. at 1204–05. 
 103.  759 S.W.2d 563, 564–65 (Ark. 1988). 
 104.  Johnson v. Jernigan, 475 P.2d 396, 399 (Okla. 1970). 
 105.  Mittelstaedt, 954 P.2d at 1209.   
 106.  Id. at 1206. 
 107.  See id. at 1208. 
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marketable product into an enhanced product, and when the lessee meets 
its burden of showing these facts.”108 
In sum, the pendulum has swung a long way in Oklahoma.  This 
state has gone from one extreme of ignoring the “gross” in “gross 
proceeds” under Jernigan, to the opposite extreme of reading “at the 
well” right out of most Oklahoma royalty clauses.  Along the way, the 
Oklahoma courts have extended the Marketable Product Rule to not only 
preclude deductions for producing a “marketable product,” but to also 
prohibit any deductions thereafter unless the lessee meets a burden of 
proving a series of facts never addressed or even implied under the 
relevant lease language. 
3. Colorado 
Shortly after Oklahoma adopted its version of the Marketable 
Product Rule, Colorado followed suit in Garman v. Conoco, Inc.109  
Garman involved a certified question from the federal district court in 
Colorado: 
Under Colorado law, is the owner of an overriding royalty interest in 
gas production required to bear a proportionate share of post-
production costs, such as processing, transportation, and compression, 
when the assignment creating the overriding royalty interest is silent as 
to how post-production costs are to be borne?110 
The Colorado Supreme Court immediately proceeded to an analysis 
under implied covenant law with little discussion of the disagreement 
among courts and scholars as to whether implied covenants should even 
apply to overriding royalty interests.111  Next, although Colorado has 
                                                          
 108.  Id. at 1210. 
 109.  886 P.2d 652 (Colo. 1994). 
 110.  Id. at 653. 
 111.  See id. at 654; see also XAE Corp. v. SMR Prop. Mgmt. Co., 968 P.2d 1201, 1204–
07 (Okla. 1998) (summarizing the controversy over application of implied covenants to 
overriding royalty interests, and ultimately rejecting the application of implied covenants to the 
overriding royalty interests at issue in the case).  As XAE Corp. explained, implied covenants 
ordinarily arise out of oil and gas leases, rather than instruments (like assignments) used to 
create overriding royalty interests.  See XAE Corp., 968 P.2d at 1204.  The concept is 
succinctly explained by Williams and Meyers as follows:  
The owner of an overriding royalty is not entitled to the benefit of the 
covenants of the base lease, express or implied, in the absence of an express 
provision in the instrument creating the overriding royalty. The benefits of 
such express and implied covenants of the lease touch and concern the lessor’s 
estate and burdens of such covenants touch and concern the lessee’s estate. 
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traditionally held that covenants implied in oil and gas leases are implied 
in fact, which requires analysis of the lease language to determine 
whether an implied covenant is even applicable, the majority in Garman 
limited its legal analysis to general principles of implied covenant law 
with no regard for the language of the disputed instrument.112 
The Garman court began its analysis by “relying on the basic 
proposition that every oil and gas lease contains an implied covenant to 
market . . . .”113  The Garman majority then catalogued some of the other 
                                                          
The assignment, either in whole or in part, of the burdened estate will not 
permit enforcement of the covenants which burden the assigned estate by a 
person other than the lessor or claimants though him of a portion or all of the 
benefitted estate.   
Id. (quoting WILLIAMS & MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAW § 420 (1981)). 
 112.  See infra note 113 and accompanying text. See generally Garman, 886 P.2d at 656–60. 
 113.  Id. at 654.  This (and similar statements from other jurisdictions) amounts to a gross 
misstatement of law.  Colorado first recognized implied covenants in oil and gas leases in Mountain 
States in 1942. Mountain States Oil Corp. v. Sandoval, 125 P.2d 964 (Colo. 1942).  Therein, the 
Colorado Supreme Court observed that “[t]he basis of [implied covenants] in each instance is the 
presumed intention of the parties. ‘Whatever is implied in a contract is as effectual as what is 
expressed. Implication is but another name for intention, and if it arises from the language of the 
contract when considered in its entirety, and is not gathered from the mere expectations of one or 
both of the parties, it is controlling.’”  Mountain States, 125 P.2d at 967 (quoting Brewster v. Lanyon 
Zinc Co., 140 F. 801, 809 (8th Cir. 1905)).  This fits the classic definition of a covenant implied in 
fact.  See David E. Pierce, The Renaissance of Law in the Law of Oil and Gas: The Contract 
Dimension, 42 WASHBURN L.J. 909, 924 (2004).  Covenants implied in fact can always be negated 
by the express terms of the agreement because implied covenants are based on presumed intent, 
which is easily rebutted by express contract language.  Thus, the unequivocal statement that “every 
oil and gas lease contains an implied covenant to market” is demonstrably incorrect.  Garman, 886 
P.2d at 654.  Indeed, the only absolute statement one can accurately make regarding covenants 
implied in fact is that not every oil and gas lease contains an implied covenant to market.  Instead, 
only those oil and gas leases that fail to expressly address the matters normally covered by the 
implied covenant to market might be found to contain an implied covenant to market. 
  To be sure, there are some covenants that are implied in every contract, but such covenants 
are implied-in-law.  See, e.g., Amoco Oil Co. v. Ervin, 908 P.2d 493, 499 (Colo. 1995) (holding that 
the covenant of good faith and fair dealing is “implied at law” in every contract and cannot be varied 
by express contract language to the contrary); see also Pierce, supra, at 911–24 (providing detailed 
analysis of implied-in-law and implied-in-fact covenants).  Unfortunately, it appears that the 
distinction between covenants implied in fact and those implied in law has been lost on Marketable 
Product Rule courts.  Indeed, the Garman court summarized its holding as, “absent an assignment 
provision to the contrary, overriding royalty interest owners are not obligated to bear any share of 
post-production expenses, such as compressing, transporting and processing, undertaken to 
transform raw gas produced at the surface into a marketable product.”  Garman, 886 P.2d at 661 
(emphasis added).  The highlighted language is completely at odds with the notion that every oil and 
gas lease (or, in this case, every instrument creating an overriding royalty interest) contains an 
implied covenant to market.  In fact, it means quite the opposite because if the covenant can be 
negated by express lease language, it is implied in fact and arises only by implication from an 
examination of the lease’s terms.  Similarly, in the concurring opinion in Garman, Justice Erickson 
made the following irreconcilable statements: “Oil and gas leases in Colorado uniformly contain an 
implied covenant to market the gas produced by the lessee . . . . The parties to an oil and gas lease 
may, by express agreement in the lease, limit the covenants implied in the lease.”  Garman, 886 P.2d 
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jurisdictions that had grappled with deduction of post-production costs, 
observing that Texas and Louisiana allowed such deductions for costs 
incurred beyond the wellhead, but that Kansas and Oklahoma had 
adopted some form of the Marketable Product Rule.114  Garman also 
tried to place Arkansas and North Dakota in the Marketable Product Rule 
camp, although Arkansas is still questionable,115 and North Dakota has 
since rejected the notion.116  The Garman court quickly concluded that, 
under Colorado’s version of the Marketable Product Rule, “absent an 
assignment provision to the contrary, overriding royalty interest owners 
are not obligated to bear any share of post-production expenses, such as 
compressing, transporting and processing, undertaken to transform raw 
gas produced at the surface into a marketable product.”117  Further, once 
a marketable product has been obtained, only those costs which a lessee 
can prove actually enhance the product’s value, are reasonable, and 
actually increase royalty revenues in proportion with such costs, may be 
deducted from the overriding royalty owner’s share of revenue.118 
Garman brings into focus one of the principal problems of the 
Marketable Product Rule: it takes a contract interpretation issue and 
converts it into an inquiry about the plaintiffs’ status.  The Garman 
majority failed to even consider the contract language, but rather made 
the case about the plaintiffs’ status as royalty owners.119  Finding that a 
royalty owner is a royalty owner (whether a lessor or the holder of an 
overriding royalty),120 the application of the implied covenant to market 
in a vacuum automatically yielded a Marketable Product Rule solution.  
To be sure, it can be enticing for overworked jurists to avoid the tedious 
work of interpreting complex agreements by crafting rules of law that 
make that inquiry unnecessary, but is this really fair to those who have 
staked their livelihood on the text of those contracts? 
                                                          
at 663, 664 (Erickson, J., concurring).  The first statement can be true only if the covenant to market 
is implied in law.  The second is true only if the covenant is implied in fact.  In either event, they are 
mutually exclusive.  Sadly, neither the majority opinion nor the concurrence recognized this 
rudimentary error.  Consequently, every case that relies on Garman’s misconception regarding 
implied covenants should be heavily scrutinized because it is based on a fundamental 
misunderstanding of the distinctions between covenants implied in law and those implied in fact. 
 114.  See Garman, 886 P.2d at 657–58. 
 115.  See id. at 658. 
 116.  See Bice v. Petro-Hunt, L.L.C., 768 N.W.2d 496 (N.D. 2009). 
 117.  Garman, 886 P.2d at 661. 
 118.  See id. 
 119.  See id. 
 120.  But see supra note 111 and accompanying text.  
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A few years after the Garman decision, the Colorado Supreme Court 
once again took up disputes over deduction of post-production costs in 
the widely panned Rogers v. Westerman Farm Co.121  In Rogers, a host 
of royalty and overriding royalty owners sued their lessees in a two-
pronged attack grounded in Colorado’s Marketable Product Rule.  First, 
the plaintiffs took the typical approach of attacking the deductibility of 
post-production costs for downstream sales under the Marketable 
Product Rule.122  Second, the plaintiffs asserted that any sales that 
occurred at the wellhead were invalid for purposes of determining their 
royalties because the Marketable Product Rule prohibited the sale of gas 
until it was in a marketable condition, and they alleged that none of the 
gas attributable to the plaintiffs’ wells was in marketable condition at the 
wellhead.123 
While noting that there were four basic variations of royalty clauses 
at issue in Rogers,124 all of which based royalty on some combination of 
market value or proceeds from sales “at the well” or “at the mouth of the 
well,” the court concluded that the leases were silent with regard to 
allocation of post-production costs.125  Relying then on the fallacy that 
every oil and gas lease contains an implied covenant to market,126 the 
court proceeded to expand the scope of the Marketable Product Rule that 
it had crafted in Garman.  Rejecting the Colorado Court of Appeals’ 
conclusion that gas is marketable if someone will buy it,127 the state 
supreme court extended its Marketable Product Rule to hold that not only 
must a lessee bear all costs to place raw gas in pipeline quality, but the 
lessee must also bear all costs to deliver such marketable gas to the 
location of an actual commercial marketplace.128  Once the lessee meets 
those two requirements, it can then deduct reasonable post-production 
costs to further enhance the gas or transport it to a more distant market.129 
                                                          
 121.  29 P.3d 887 (Colo. 2001). 
 122.  Id. at 893–94. 
 123.  Id. at 893.  Plaintiffs also alleged that the wellhead sales were not arms-length transactions 
because the purchasers were “closely linked” to the lessees; consequently, those sales were likewise 
invalid under the Marketable Product Rule.  See id.  
 124.  Id. at 891 n.1. 
 125.  See id. at 896–97. 
 126.  Id. at 902.  See supra note 113 and accompanying text. 
 127.  See Rogers v. Westerman Farm Co., 29 P.3d 887, 895–96 (Colo. 2001) (rejecting the court 
of appeals’ conclusion that “the fact that the gas was actually sold at the well showed that it was 
marketable there”). 
 128.  Id. at 906. 
 129.  Id. 
BROOMES_FINAL_PUBLICATIONREADY.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 11/11/2014  9:51 AM 
2014] WASTE NOT, WANT NOT 169 
Rogers represents many extremes in oil and gas contract 
interpretation.  The Colorado Supreme Court seems to set the stage by 
first impugning the lessees because their standard royalty clauses provide 
“an initial misleading appearance that the lease language provides for 
allocation of costs.”130  The court further maligns the lessees by 
analogizing them with insurance companies based on an oil and gas 
treatise written almost a hundred years earlier.131  Having thus 
established the moral basis for what it is about to do, the court proceeds 
to lay waste to a number of legal precepts of oil and gas contract 
interpretation that were, by and large, well-established at the time the 
leases were entered into.  First, the court ignores long-established 
Colorado precedent that implied covenants are implied in fact (which 
requires examination of the individual lease terms),132 by simply 
grouping all the applicable royalty clauses into four groups and then 
ignoring the distinctions that exist even among those groups.133  Instead, 
the court concludes that the implied covenant to market applies to every 
lease (which, by definition, means that the covenant is implied in law, 
                                                          
 130.  Id. at 897 (emphasis added). 
 131.  Id. at 902 (citing Ladd v. Upham, 58 S.W.2d 1037, 1039 (Tex. Civ. App. 1933)). 
 132.  See Mountain States Oil Corp. v. Sandoval, 125 P.2d 964, 967 (Colo. 1942); see also supra 
note 113 and accompanying text.  
 133.  See Rogers, 29 P.3d at 897–98.  While the four royalty clause variants expressed the means 
for determining royalty with varying levels of clarity, id. at 891 n.1, the Type 1 clause was certainly 
of sufficient clarity to merit different treatment if the court were truly trying to apply the language as 
written.  The Type 1 clause read as follows:  
[L]essee shall pay to lessor a sum equal to one-eighth (1/8th) of the gross proceeds 
received from the sale of such produced substances where the same is sold at the mouth 
of the well or, if not sold at the mouth of the well, then one-eighth (1/8th) of the market 
value thereof at the mouth of the well, but in no event more than one-eighths of the actual 
amount received by the lessee for the sale thereof.    
Id.  This clause very specifically provided for two different scenarios.  First, if gas was actually sold 
at the well, then royalty was based on the gross proceeds received by the lessee.  The use of the term 
“gross proceeds,” rather than “net proceeds,” indicates that no deductions were to be taken, which is 
consistent with a sale at the well where there would be no post-production costs incurred from the 
wellhead to some downstream point of sale.  Id.  However, in the event of a downstream sale, this 
clause quite clearly provides that “if not sold at the mouth of the well,” royalty is based on the 
market value at the well.  Id.  In both instances, royalty is based on the value of the gas as it comes 
out of the ground.  The “market value . . . at the mouth of the well” prong of the Type 1 royalty 
clause anchors royalty to the wellhead despite a downstream sale, while the “gross proceeds” prong 
removes the uncertainty in determining market value by basing royalty on the actual proceeds of any 
sales that occur at the wellhead.  Id.  This language is clear, requires no imagination to apply, and 
provides no gap for the alchemy of the Marketable Product Rule to intervene.  As Rogers 
demonstrates, application of the Marketable Product Rule to the Type 1 clause collapses the two 
alternative methods for calculating royalty that are expressly set forth therein into a single, court-
imposed royalty calculation based on value at some downstream market where the gas meets the 
court’s definition of marketability. 
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thus overruling Colorado precedent),134 thereby dictating a uniform result 
regardless of the express terms of the lease.135  Second, the court ignores 
express “at the well” language in the royalty clauses, rendering those 
words utterly meaningless, thus violating the canon of construction 
against rendering contract terms as mere surplusage.136  Third, in the face 
of a stinging rebuke by its Marketable Product Rule sister court from 
Oklahoma for Colorado’s unprincipled application of implied covenant 
law to overriding royalty interests,137 the Rogers court stubbornly 
reaffirmed its holding from Garman that a royalty interest is a royalty 
interest.138  Thus, despite the fact that implied covenants arise out of the 
oil and gas lease in favor of the lessor, not from an assignment or 
reservation of an overriding royalty interest, under Colorado’s version of 
the Marketable Product Rule all royalty owners deserve the same 
benevolent treatment, whether they are lessors, former lessees, or even 
sophisticated investors.139  Through Garman and Rogers, Colorado has 
probably pushed the Marketable Product Rule to its most extreme 
interpretation within the United States. 
4. West Virginia 
In the realm of the post-production cost deductibility wars, West 
Virginia seems to take a rather unique approach.  While most 
commentators include West Virginia with the Marketable Product Rule 
states,140 West Virginia has actually achieved a Marketable Product Rule 
                                                          
 134.  See supra notes 124–26 and accompanying text.  Curiously, the Rogers court also states 
that “the implied covenant to market controls the allocation of costs under circumstances where lease 
language fails to address cost allocation.”  Rogers v. Westerman Farm Co., 29 P.3d 887, 900 (Colo. 
2001).  That sounds a lot like a covenant implied in fact, except that the court continues to repeat its 
statement that the implied covenant to market is implied in every lease.  Id. at 902, 903.  To the 
extent those two principles can be reconciled, at a practical level it appears to mean that the implied 
covenant to market represents the default rule, which can theoretically be negated by express lease 
language, although we have yet to see any lease provisions that can actually withstand the 
nullification power of Colorado’s Marketable Product Rule.   
 135.  See generally Rogers, 29 P.3d at 896–99. 
 136.  See id.; see also infra note 163 and accompanying text. 
 137.  Id. at 902 n.16 (noting disagreement with Oklahoma’s XAE Corp. v. SMR Prop. Mgmt. 
Co., 968 P.2d 1201 (Okla. 1998)). 
 138.  Id. at 902. 
139. Id. 
 140.  See, e.g., Keeling & Gillespie, supra note 1, at 5; Lindsey Scheel, Oil and Gas Law-Rent or 
Royalties: North Dakota Joins the Majority of States in Adopting the “At the Well” Rule for 
Calculating Royalties on Oil and Gas Leases Bice v. Petro-Hunt, L.L.C., 2009 Nd 124, 768 N.W.2d 
496, 85 N.D. L. REV. 919, 927 (2009); see Karen E. Kahle & Denielle M. Stritch, Grouping the 
Marcellus Payout: Use of Class Actions in Royalty Litigation Concerning Post-Production Cost 
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result that seems to arise more from an unwillingness to accept the 
realities of deregulation in the natural gas market than from implied 
covenant law.141  The West Virginia approach can be traced through two 
cases.  In Wellman v. Energy Res., Inc.,142 a lessor attacked deductions of 
post-production expenses under a royalty clause that provided for royalty 
on “one-eighth (1/8) of the proceeds from the sale of gas as such at the 
mouth of the well.”143  Although the lessee disposed of the gas through a 
downstream sale for $2.22 per MCF, it calculated royalty based on a 
sales price of $0.87 per MCF, alleging that the difference was due to 
unspecified and unsupported post-production costs.144 
Rather than begin with an analysis of the lease provision, the 
Wellman court turned first to a 1951 West Virginia oil and gas treatise 
that stated: 
From the very beginning of the oil and gas industry it has been the 
practice to compensate the landowner by selling the oil by running it to 
a common carrier and paying him [the landowner] one-eighth of the 
sale price received.  This practice has, in recent years, been extended to 
the situations where gas is found.  The one-eighth received is 
commonly referred to as the landowner’s royalty.145 
Next, the court makes a brief review of the ongoing Marketable 
Product Rule dispute between Texas and Louisiana, on the one hand, and 
Colorado, Oklahoma, and Kansas, on the other.146  Voicing some 
approval of the Marketable Product Rule,147 and noting that, like the 
other Marketable Product Rule jurisdictions, West Virginia recognizes an 
implied covenant to market,148 Wellman seemed to be plotting a course to 
                                                          
Deductions, 88 N.D. L. REV. 699, 724 (2012); Rachel M. Kirk, Variations in the Marketable-
Product Rule from State to State, 60 OKLA. L. REV. 769, 799–800 (2007); David E. Pierce, Royalty 
Jurisprudence: A Tale of Two States, 49 WASHBURN L.J. 347, 373 n.144 (2010).  
 141.  See Pierce, supra note 140, at 367–68. 
 142.  557 S.E.2d 254 (W. Va. 2001). 
 143.  Id. at 258. 
 144.  See id. at 263, 265. 
 145.  Id. at 263 (quoting ROBERT DONLEY, THE LAW OF COAL, OIL AND GAS IN WEST VIRGINIA 
AND VIRGINIA § 104 (1951)). 
 146.  See id. at 264–65. 
 147.  See id. at 265. 
 148.  See id.  The significance of this observation is unclear.  Virtually all oil and gas producing 
states, including Texas and Louisiana, recognize the implied covenant to market.  See Stirman v. 
Exxon Corp., 280 F.3d 554, 564–65 (5th Cir. 2002) (listing most of the oil- and gas-producing states 
as recognizing an implied covenant to market); See also Kirk, supra note 140, at 774 (stating that it 
is not the recognition of the covenant, but its application that distinguishes Marketable Product Rule 
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add West Virginia to the list of Marketable Product Rule states, 
concluding, “if an oil and gas lease provides for a royalty based on 
proceeds received by the lessee, unless the lease provides otherwise, the 
lessee must bear all costs incurred in exploring for, producing, 
marketing, and transporting the product to the point of sale.”149  While 
the “point of sale” language would be a new twist on the Rule, the rest of 
the quote sounds a lot like a Marketable Product Rule formulation. 
However, the legal foundation for West Virginia’s approach to 
address the deductibility of post-production costs became a lot less clear 
after Estate of Tawney v. Columbia Natural Res., L.L.C.150  Tawney was 
a royalty-owner class action involving some 8,000 plaintiffs, and 
included over 1,300 oil and gas leases that provided for royalty using 
some variation of “at the wellhead” language.151  As in Wellman, where 
the lessee calculated royalty on a price far below the actual sale price 
without providing any evidence of deductible costs, Tawney was also 
predicated on bad facts in that this lessee deducted post-production costs 
without even disclosing the deductions on the lessors’ accounting 
statements.152 
As in Wellman, the Tawney court briefly reviewed the ongoing 
skirmish between other states regarding the Marketable Product Rule, but 
declined to formally take sides, choosing instead to rely on the trail 
previously blazed in Wellman.153  Reaffirming its reliance on the 1951 
treatise, and quoting extensively from Wellman, the West Virginia 
Supreme Court picked up where it left off in Wellman and concluded that 
                                                          
states from other jurisdictions; in a non-Marketable Product Rule state, the implied covenant to 
market does not impose a duty to market for free).  
 149.  Wellman, 557 S.E.2d at 265. 
 150.  633 S.E.2d 22 (W. Va. 2006). 
 151.  Id. at 25.  By allowing royalty-owner class actions like this, the courts have helped create 
the very circumstances that often motivate them to craft unprincipled “one-size-fits-all” solutions.  
Oil and gas leases are just contracts.  Basic contract law teaches us that the first step in interpreting a 
contract is to analyze the language contained therein.  Only after that examination reveals an 
ambiguity do we consider rules of construction, extrinsic evidence, and, in the oil and gas context, 
implied covenants.  However, when we allow contract cases to proceed as class actions, judges are 
faced with the daunting task of examining hundreds, even thousands, of contracts in a single case.  
Human nature being what it is, judges are tempted to look for shortcuts to avoid such a burdensome 
task.  The methodology applied by Marketable Product Rule courts represents such a shortcut.  
Cases like Rogers and Tawney take thousands of different contracts, place them in a handful of 
groups, and then, with a paragraph or so, collapse all the groups into a single analysis in which 
implied covenants and generalizations replace rigorous contract examination.  The result is sweeping 
public policy decisions manifested as rules of law that override the terms of thousands upon 
thousands of individually negotiated agreements. 
 152.  See id. at 25.  
 153.  See id. at 26–27. 
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none of the various formulations of “at the wellhead” language presented 
in the 1,300-plus leases was sufficient to allocate post-production 
costs.154  Consequently, none of the defendant lessee’s leases allowed it 
to deduct post-production costs from the lessors’ royalties.155 
In both Wellman and Tawney, we see West Virginia’s unique 
approach to the deductibility of post-production costs.  First, and most 
obvious, West Virginia’s formulation is tied directly to the point of sale.  
Neither Wellman nor Tawney appeared to put any qualifications on the 
point-of-sale aspect of the West Virginia rule, so presumably it is 
irrelevant whether the point of sale occurs at the wellhead or the burner 
tip; in either event, the lessor would receive a cost-free royalty on the 
sale proceeds.156  The more intriguing aspect of the West Virginia rule is 
the manner in which it clings to pre-deregulation marketing practices.  
As Professor David Pierce notes in his article, Royalty Jurisprudence: A 
Tale of Two States, the treatise on which the West Virginia Supreme 
Court relied so heavily for its pronouncement that West Virginia lessors 
traditionally received a cost-free royalty out of the sale price was written 
in 1951 in the midst of the regulatory scheme imposed under the Natural 
Gas Act of 1938, in which almost all sales of natural gas occurred at the 
wellhead.157  Similarly, the Tawney court impugned the lessee, stating, 
“although some of the leases below were executed several decades ago, 
apparently [the lessee] did not begin deducting post-production costs 
from the lessors’ royalty payments until about 1993.”158  As Pierce 
observes, this change in the lessee’s accounting practices corresponded 
with the end of the regulatory scheme in 1993.159  Accordingly, it seems 
that the West Virginia court failed to consider the effects of regulation 
and deregulation on the sales and marketing practices of lessees, 
                                                          
 154.  See id. at 28. 
 155.  See id. at 30. 
 156.  Both Tawney and Wellman included brief statements about the lessor’s duty to render the 
gas in marketable condition.  See Tawney, 633 S.E.2d at 27; see also Wellman v. Energy Res., Inc., 
557 S.E.2d 254, 265 (W. Va. 2001).  However, it is difficult to determine whether West Virginia 
would rely on that language to suggest that a wellhead sale was improper because the gas was not in 
marketable condition.  If West Virginia intended to leave that possibility open, it would have been 
best to include that caveat in its formulation of the holdings in Wellman and Tawney.  The court’s 
failure to do so strongly implies that the true focus will be the point of sale, not marketability.  But 
see W.W. McDonald Land Co. v. EQT Prod. Co., 983 F. Supp. 2d 790, 799–802 (S.D.W. Va. 2014) 
(expressly rejecting statements in Tawney and Wellman regarding point of sale and holding instead 
that the lessee’s duty to market is satisfied upon delivery to an actual market). 
 157.  Pierce, supra note 140, at 367–68. 
 158.  Tawney, 633 S.E.2d at 28.  
 159.  Pierce, supra note 140, at 368. 
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assuming instead that historical practices from a bygone era of robust 
regulation represent industry norms even in an unregulated market.  In 
any event, West Virginia is probably counted among Marketable Product 
Rule jurisdictions more because it has achieved something in the nature 
of a Marketable Product Rule result, than because it applies a Marketable 
Product Rule analysis. 
III. PROBLEMS CREATED BY THE MARKETABLE PRODUCT RULE 
Aside from the public policy problems discussed infra, the 
Marketable Product Rule suffers from a number of other infirmities.  
First, the Marketable Product Rule results in a judicially directed wealth 
transfer from lessees to lessors that contradicts the bargained-for 
exchange struck by the parties, as expounded upon by years of court 
precedent.160  It seems counter-intuitive that courts would ignore explicit 
“at the well” language, finding it ambiguous, but nevertheless conclude 
that the lease implicitly calls for royalty to be valued at some point 
further down the innumerable miles of pipelines, meters, and facilities 
downstream of the wellhead, at which point the product becomes 
marketable for royalty calculation purposes.  As for those jurisdictions 
like Colorado and West Virginia, which have “solved” the resulting 
location problem by grafting in their own determinations as to 
marketable location or point of sale, those decisions are completely 
unmoored from the text of the underlying leases.  On the contrary, the 
lease language should be the beginning point for any exercise in contract 
interpretation.161  Indeed, while Marketable Product Rule courts often 
begin by concluding that “at the well” language is ambiguous (or even 
“silent”)162 with respect to allocation of post-production costs, those 
courts universally fail to offer any suggestion as to why the phrase “at 
the well” is included in the royalty clause.  This violates the cardinal rule 
of construction that courts must strive to give meaning to every term in 
the lease, rendering none as mere surplusage.163  Under the Marketable 
                                                          
 160.  See Keeling & Gillespie, supra note 1, at 30–31. 
 161.  See supra note 113 and accompanying text.  
 162.  See, e.g., Rogers v. Westerman Farm Co., 29 P.3d 887, 902 (Colo. 2001). 
 163.  17A C.J.S. Contracts § 400 (2014) (“construction rendering a provision, term, or part 
meaningless, superfluous, surplusage, useless, inexplicable, or nugatory should be avoided.”); id. § 
418; 11 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 32:1 (4th ed. 2012) (“Individual clauses and particular words 
of the agreement, and all parts of the writing and every word of it, will, if possible, be given 
effect.”); see also Pierce, supra note 140, at 361–64 (observing that Marketable Product Rule courts 
“negate” the meaning and effect of “at the well” language in royalty clauses). 
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Product Rule, “at the well” is rendered meaningless surplusage, with 
courts essentially re-writing the lease to provide for royalty based on 
“market value at the location where the gas achieves pipeline quality.”164  
The Colorado Supreme Court demonstrates a striking example of this 
problem in Rogers where, after noting the obvious problem with 
rendering “at the well” meaningless, the court brazenly proceeds to do 
precisely that.165 
Perhaps more troubling, the Marketable Product Rule essentially 
forces the lessee to be the guarantor of the physical properties of any 
natural gas discovered on the leased premises by requiring the lessee to 
bear the risk that gas of lesser quality may be located thereunder, as 
compared to better gas that more closely matches the specifications for 
pipeline quality.  This idea may be best illustrated through a comparison 
with hard-rock mining.  If a miner discovers silver on one tract of land 
and gold on another, no one expects the miner to pay the silver royalty 
owner as if his land produced gold.  Instead, the law implicitly 
recognizes that the bounties of nature are not evenly distributed, and that 
each mineral owner is entitled to the benefits of those valuable minerals, 
if any, discovered on his property.  As natural and unremarkable as that 
may sound, the world gets turned on its head when the Marketable 
Product Rule is applied: landowners fortunate enough to have under their 
property large volumes of low-pressure, sour gas, with high levels of 
moisture and carbon dioxide, are to be paid as if they had the better 
fortune of being underlain with high-pressure, sweet gas, containing no 
other contaminants, with the lessee bearing the expense of correcting the 
disparity.166  Just as a hard-rock miner is not expected to guarantee that 
every mineral deposit is gold, the oil and gas lessee should not have to 
warrant that all gas he discovers will be pipeline quality when it comes 
out of the ground.  Instead, lessor and lessee should equally bear the risk 
in the random distributions of gas quality found in nature.167 
                                                          
 164.  Rogers, 29 P.3d at 902.  
 165.  Rogers, 29 P.3d at 906 (noting Professor Anderson’s efforts to apply the Marketable 
Product Rule while retaining some meaning for “at the well” language, and then rejecting same.). 
 166.  Cf. Richardson v. Homestake Min. Co., 322 F.2d 329 (10th Cir. 1963) (stating that in the 
hard-rock mining context, the lessee is entitled to deduct from lessor’s royalty a proportionate share 
of post-production costs incurred to process ore). 
 167.  See Pierce, supra note 140, at 375 (“[W]hich party is responsible for the fortuity of bad 
geology?  Is it the lessee’s fault the leased land is located miles from the nearest interstate pipeline?  
Is it the lessee’s fault that the gas that is discovered is of low pressure, of low British thermal units 
(Btu), or low-volume gas with contaminants such as water, hydrogen sulphide, and carbon dioxide?  
In each case, the parties must deal with the geological facts associated with the leased land.  Nobody 
is at fault; nobody is responsible for the situation.”). 
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IV. THE PUBLIC POLICY AGAINST WASTE 
A. Conservation Statutes 
Like most oil and gas producing states, each and every Marketable 
Product Rule jurisdiction has at least one statute proclaiming that the 
public policy of that state prohibits waste of oil and gas resources.  The 
Kansas legislature has declared that “[t]he production of natural gas in 
the state of Kansas in such manner and under such conditions and for 
such purposes as to constitute waste is hereby prohibited.”168  
Oklahoma’s statute proscribing waste of natural gas tracks the Kansas 
version almost word-for-word.169  The West Virginia legislature has 
staked out its position with even more sweeping language, stating: 
It is hereby declared to be the public policy of this state and in the 
public interest to: 
(1) Foster, encourage and promote exploration for and development, 
production, utilization and conservation of oil and gas resources; 
(2) Prohibit waste of oil and gas resources . . . ; [and] 
(3) Encourage the maximum recovery of oil and gas . . . .170 
Finally, like West Virginia, the Colorado legislature has expressly 
recognized the public, as well as the private, interest in preventing waste, 
stating, “It is declared to be in the public interest to . . . [p]rotect the 
public and private interests against waste in the production and 
utilization of oil and gas.”171 
                                                          
 168.  KAN. STAT. ANN. § 55-701 (2012); see also id. § 55-601 (prohibiting waste of crude oil 
and petroleum). 
 169.  See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52, § 236 (West 2001) (“The production of natural gas in the 
State of Oklahoma, in such manner, and under such conditions as to constitute waste, shall be 
unlawful”); see also id. § 271 (prohibiting waste of crude oil and petroleum); id. § 86.2 (“The 
production of oil in the State of Oklahoma in such manner and under such conditions as to constitute 
waste as in this act defined is hereby prohibited”); id. § 86.3 (“The production of gas in the State of 
Oklahoma in such manner and under such conditions as to constitute waste as in this act defined is 
hereby prohibited”). 
 170.   W. VA. CODE ANN. § 22C-9-1(a) (West Supp. 2013); see also id. § 22C-9-6 (“Waste of oil 
or gas is hereby prohibited”); see also id. § 22C-8-1 (declaring public policy to maximize recovery 
of coal and natural gas where both underlie same lands). 
 171.  COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 34-60-102(1)(a)(II) (West Supp. 2013); see also id. § 34-60-107 
(“The waste of oil and gas in the state of Colorado is prohibited by this article”).  
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Indeed, there is a great public interest, both for a given state and for 
our nation, in responsibly maximizing the production of oil and gas 
resources.172  Energy is the lifeblood of our economy, indispensible for 
manufacturing and transporting goods; without it, store shelves would be 
empty because there would be no fuel to move goods to market, and our 
economy would grind to a halt as people could not commute to work.  
Severance taxes on hydrocarbon production send much needed revenues 
into the coffers of producing states, while drilling and production 
operations contribute jobs to an ailing economy.  The more America’s 
energy needs can be met domestically, the less dependent our nation 
becomes on foreign energy sources, which are often found in areas of the 
world that are politically unstable or not otherwise favorably disposed 
toward the United States.  Finally, natural gas, which is the focus of this 
paper, is an abundant, comparatively environmentally friendly energy 
source, having a little over half the carbon emissions per unit of energy 
as crude oil, and an even smaller fraction when compared to coal.173  For 
all these reasons, and many others, the legislatures of these Marketable 
Product Rule states have correctly observed that it is in the public interest 
to prevent waste, and maximize production, of oil and gas resources. 
B. What is Waste? 
In defining “waste” for their statutory purposes, each of these states 
has embraced an expansive view of the concept, combining the 
traditional view of “physical waste, as the term is generally understood in 
the oil and gas industry,”174 with a multitude of additional descriptions to 
rake in economic waste, underground waste, surface waste, and an array 
of other permutations.175  Interestingly, it is not the expansive concept of 
                                                          
 172.  See generally Coastal Oil & Gas Corp. v. Garza Energy Trust, 268 S.W.3d 1, 26–29 (Tex. 
2008) (Willett, J., concurring). 
 173.  See Dr. William C.G. Burns, A Voice for the Fish? Climate Change Litigation and 
Potential Causes of Action for Impacts Under the United Nations Fish Stocks Agreement, 48 SANTA 
CLARA L. REV. 605, 624 (2008); Arnold W. Reitze, Jr., Federal Control of Carbon Dioxide 
Emissions: What Are the Options?, 36 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 1, 20 (2009). 
 174.  W. VA. CODE ANN. § 22-6-1(v) (West Supp. 2013). 
 175.  See id.  Colorado provides the following definitions of “waste” for oil and gas conservation 
purposes:  
(11) “Waste”, as applied to gas, includes the escape, blowing, or releasing, directly or 
indirectly into the open air, of gas from wells productive of gas only, or gas in an 
excessive or unreasonable amount from wells producing oil, or both oil and gas; and the 
production of gas in quantities or in such manner as unreasonably reduces reservoir 
pressure or unreasonably diminishes the quantity of oil or gas that ultimately may be 
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produced; excepting gas that is reasonably necessary in the drilling, completing, testing, 
and in furnishing power for the production of wells. 
(12) “Waste”, as applied to oil, includes underground waste; inefficient, excessive, or 
improper use or dissipation of reservoir energy, including gas energy and water drive; 
surface waste; open-pit storage; and waste incident to the production of oil in excess of 
the producer’s aboveground storage facilities and lease and contractual requirements, but 
excluding storage, other than open-pit storage, reasonably necessary for building up or 
maintaining crude stocks and products thereof for consumption, use, and sale. 
(13) “Waste”, in addition to the meanings as set forth in subsections (11) and (12) of this 
section, means: 
(a) Physical waste, as that term is generally understood in the oil and gas industry; 
(b) The locating, spacing, drilling, equipping, operating, or producing of any oil or gas 
well or wells in a manner which causes or tends to cause reduction in quantity of oil or 
gas ultimately recoverable from a pool under prudent and proper operations or which 
causes or tends to cause unnecessary or excessive surface loss or destruction of oil or 
gas; 
(c) Abuse of the correlative rights of any owner in a pool due to nonuniform, 
disproportionate, unratable, or excessive withdrawals of oil or gas therefrom, causing 
reasonably avoidable drainage between tracts of land or resulting in one or more 
producers or owners in such pool producing more than his equitable share of the oil or 
gas from such pool. 
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 34-60-103 (West Supp. 2013) (emphasis added).  
The Oklahoma legislature has defined waste in a number of different statutes, each having some 
slight variation from the others, but all defined to include the “ordinary” meaning of the term: 
The term “waste”, as applied to gas, in addition to its ordinary meaning, shall include the 
inefficient or wasteful utilization of gas in the operation of oil wells drilled to and 
producing from a common source of supply; the inefficient or wasteful utilization of gas 
from gas wells drilled to and producing from a common source of supply; the production 
of gas in such quantities or in such manner as unreasonably to reduce reservoir pressure 
or unreasonably to diminish the quantity of oil or gas that might be recovered from a 
common source of supply; the escape, directly or indirectly, of gas from oil wells 
producing from a common source of supply into the open air in excess of the amount 
necessary in the efficient drilling, completion or operation thereof; waste incident to the 
production of natural gas in excess of transportation and marketing facilities or 
reasonable market demand; the escape, blowing or releasing, directly or indirectly, into 
the open air, of gas from wells productive of gas only, drilled into any common source of 
supply, save only such as is necessary in the efficient drilling and completion thereof; and 
the unnecessary depletion or inefficient utilization of gas energy contained in a common 
source of supply. 
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52, § 86.3 (West 2011) (emphasis added); see also id. § 86.2 (similar 
concepts applied to waste of oil). 
The term waste, as used herein in addition to its ordinary meaning, shall include escape 
of natural gas in commercial quantities into the open air, the intentional drowning with 
water of a gas stratum capable of producing gas in commercial quantities, underground 
waste, the permitting of any natural gas well to wastefully burn and the wasteful 
utilization of such gas. 
Id. § 237; see also id. § 273 (similar concepts applied to waste of oil).   
Finally, Kansas defines waste in the natural gas context as follows: 
The term “waste”, in addition to its ordinary meaning, shall include economic waste, 
underground waste and surface waste. Economic waste shall mean the use of natural gas 
in any manner or process except for efficient light, fuel, carbon black manufacturing and 
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waste, but the narrower traditional view of the term that is implicated 
under the Marketable Product Rule. 
Physical waste is generally defined as “the loss of oil or gas that 
could have been recovered and put to use,”176 and further described to 
include the “failure to recover the maximum quantity [of oil or gas] 
which theoretically could be produced.”177  Accordingly, any 
circumstance that precludes recovery of all the oil or gas that would 
otherwise be economically recoverable from a given property may be 
said to cause physical waste of those hydrocarbon resources. 
C. The Legislatures’ Role in Establishing Public Policy Against Waste 
After declaring the importance of maximizing recovery of 
hydrocarbon resources, and articulating the strong public policy against 
waste, the legislatures of the Marketable Product Rule states went even 
further by establishing conservation agencies that were then given, as a 
principal duty, the responsibility to prevent waste of the state’s oil and 
gas resources.178  These agencies were given authority to prescribe rules 
and regulations in support of the legislatures’ stated public policies on 
waste,179 and to impose fines and penalties on those who failed to 
comply.180  In a further effort to avoid waste and to maximize 
hydrocarbon recovery, the legislature of each Marketable Product Rule 
state even crafted exemptions from severance tax for marginal wells, 
which helps extend their economic life.181  In sum, the legislature of each 
                                                          
repressuring, or for chemical or other processes by which such gas is efficiently 
converted into a solid or a liquid substance. 
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 55-702 (2012); see also id. § 55-602 (similar definition for waste of crude oil). 
 176.  8 MARTIN & KRAMER, supra note 11, at 1133. 
 177.  Id. at 765; see also supra note 175 (showing emphasized portions of statutory waste 
definitions consistent with this general definition). 
 178.  See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 34-60-117(1) (West 2014); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 55-704 
(2012); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52, § 86.2 (West 2011); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 22C-9-4(e), (f) (West 
2006). 
 179.  See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 34-60-105(1) (West 2014); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 55-704 
(2012); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52, § 86.2 (West 2011); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 22C-9-5 (West 2006). 
 180.  See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 34-60-121(1) (West 2014); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 55-708 
(2012); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52, § 143 (West 2011); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 22C-9-14 (West 2006). 
 181.  See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 39-29-105(1)(b) (West Supp. 2013); KAN. STAT. ANN. 
§ 79-4217(b)(1)(D) (West Supp. 2013); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 68, § 1001.3a (West Supp. 2014); W. 
VA. CODE ANN. § 11-13A-3a(a)(2) (West 2010).  While the other states’ legislatures implicitly seek 
to prevent premature abandonment of recoverable hydrocarbon reserves through their severance tax 
exemptions, the application of Oklahoma’s exemption is expressly limited to an “economically at-
risk oil or gas lease,” defined as one reaching the type of economic limit that would trigger lease 
 
BROOMES_FINAL_PUBLICATIONREADY.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 11/11/2014  9:51 AM 
180 KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 63 
Marketable Product Rule state has gone to considerable effort to declare 
and emphasize the importance of encouraging the development, and the 
efficient, thorough, recovery of its limited energy resources. 
Nevertheless, these same legislative bodies have endeavored to strike 
a balance between maximizing hydrocarbon recovery and protecting 
other important public interests.  For example, each of these states has 
charged its conservation agency with limiting hydrocarbon production 
when necessary to safeguard health and environmental concerns such as 
safe drinking water.182  In response, these agencies have established 
detailed requirements for casing oil and gas wells to protect aquifers;183 
they have imposed rigorous requirements for casing integrity tests prior 
to permitting underground injection of fluids;184 and they have 
promulgated regulations restricting production when it would cause the 
release of harmful substances into the environment.185  Likewise, the 
desire to produce more oil and gas has often been forced to give way to 
the need to ensure a safe work environment for those employed in the 
field.186 
Viewed collectively, these facts demonstrate that the legislature of 
each oil and gas producing state has established a comprehensive 
statutory scheme under which the general prohibition against waste is 
balanced with exceptions that might limit recovery of oil and gas 
resources when necessary to promote other important public interests 
such as protection of health, safety, and the environment.  This 
prerogative to declare the public policy of the given state, and to 
delineate the exceptions thereto, generally lies exclusively with the 
legislature, not with the judiciary.187  Once the legislature has established 
                                                          
termination due to a failure to produce in paying quantities.  OKLA. STAT. ANN. Tit. 68, § 
1001.3a.A.1 (West Supp. 2014).   
 182.  See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 34-60-106(2)(d) (West Supp. 2013); KAN. STAT. ANN. 
§ 55-152 (West Supp. 2013); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52, § 139 (West Supp. 2013); W. VA. CODE 
ANN. § 22-6-2 (West Supp. 2013). 
 183.  See, e.g., 2 COLO. CODE REGS. § 404-1:317 (2014); KAN. ADMIN. REGS. § 82-3-106 
(2014); OKLA. ADMIN. CODE § 165:10-3-4 (2014); W. VA. CODE R. § 35-4-7, 11 (2014). 
 184.  See, e.g., 2 COLO. CODE REGS. § 404-1:326 (2014); KAN. ADMIN. REGS. § 82-3-407 
(2014); OKLA. ADMIN. CODE § 165:10-5-6 (2014); W. VA. CODE R. § 35-4-7.3 (2014). 
 185.  See, e.g., 2 COLO. CODE REGS. § 404-1:324A (2014); KAN. ADMIN. REGS. § 82-3-104 
(2014); OKLA. ADMIN. CODE § 165:10-7-5 (2014); W. VA. CODE R. § 35-4-7.2 (2014). 
 186.  See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 34-60-106(10), (11)(a)(II) (West Supp. 2013); OKLA. 
STAT. ANN. tit. 52, § 149 (West 2011); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 22-6-2(c)(9) (West Supp. 2013). 
 187.  See, e.g., McCutchen v. City of Fort Smith, 425 S.W.3d 671, 681 (Ark. 2012); Stevenson v. 
Superior Court, 941 P.2d 1157, 1161 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997) (“tethering public policy to specific 
constitutional or statutory provisions serves . . . to avoid judicial interference with the legislative 
domain . . . .”); Martin v. People, 27 P.3d 846, 848 (Colo. 2001); Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Rosen, 949 
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public policy on a matter, the courts are generally bound to adhere to that 
policy.188  Thus, when the legislature has expressly set forth the public 
policy against waste, and carefully enumerated the exceptions to that 
policy, the judiciary should be extremely circumspect about departing 
from decades of precedent settling the meaning of common contractual 
terms like the royalty clauses that gave rise to the Marketable Product 
Rule.  Likewise, courts should be particularly reluctant to embark on 
journeys to craft new doctrines, like the Marketable Product Rule, that 
conflict with the legislature’s determination of public policy and frustrate 
the extraordinary efforts undertaken by the legislative body to achieve its 
policy goals, especially when the plain language of the underlying 
royalty clauses has yielded a result consistent with the legislature’s stated 
policy goals for decades prior to the adoption of Marketable Product 
Rule jurisprudence.189 
                                                          
N.E.2d 639, 645 (Ill. 2011) (“‘[w]hen the legislature has declared, by law, the public policy of the 
State, the judicial department must remain silent . . . .’” (alteration in original) (quoting Reed v. 
Farmers Ins. Grp., 720 N.E.2d 1052, 1057 (Ill. 1999))); State v. Hendrix, 218 P.3d 40, 43 (Kan. 
2009) superseded by statute, Kan. Stat. Ann. § 21-5221 (Supp. 2013) (superseding the “use of force” 
definition but not disturbing the rule that the legislature determines public policy); Duncan v. 
Oklahoma Dep’t of Corr., 95 P.3d 1076, 1079 (Okla. 2004); Weaver v. Harpster, 975 A.2d 555, 563 
(Pa. 2009) (“In our judicial system, the power of the courts to declare pronouncements of public 
policy is sharply restricted.  Rather, it is for the legislature to formulate the public policies of the 
Commonwealth.”); Smith v. Gore, 728 S.W.2d 738, 746–47 (Tenn. 1987) (public policy to be 
determined by legislature; judicial declaration of public policy a “usurpation” of legislative 
authority); FM Props. Operating Co. v. City of Austin, 22 S.W.3d 868, 873 (Tex. 2000) (“Generally, 
commentators have defined legislative power as the power to make rules and determine public 
policy.” (citing SOTIRIOS A. BARBER, THE CONSTITUTION AND DELEGATION OF CONGRESSIONAL 
POWER 38 (1975))); Flynn v. Dep’t of Admin., 576 N.W.2d 245, 252 (Wis. 1998) (legislature, not 
courts, determines public policy). 
 188.  See, e.g., Bhd. of Locomotive Firemen & Enginemen v. Chicago, R.I. & P.R. Co., 393 U.S. 
129, 138 (1968) (“[P]ublic policy can, under our constitutional system, be fixed only by the people 
acting through their elected representatives.”); Miles v. Idaho Power Co., 778 P.2d 757, 762 (Idaho 
1989); Roanoke Agency, Inc. v. Edgar, 461 N.E.2d 1365, 1371 (Ill. Ct. App. 1984) (courts must 
defer to legislature’s pronouncement of public policy); A.B. v. State, 949 N.E.2d 1204, 1225 (Ind. 
2011); Wicina ex rel. Wicina v. Strecker, 747 P.2d 167, 171 (Kan. 1987) (“Courts must respect 
legislative expressions when determining or when forming public policy.”); Budding v. SSM 
Healthcare Sys., 19 S.W.3d 678, 682 (Mo. 2000). 
 189.  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS: INTERPRETATION FAVORING THE PUBLIC § 
207 (1981) (“In choosing among the reasonable meanings of a promise or agreement or a term 
thereof, a meaning that serves the public interest is generally preferred.”); see also Time Warner 
Entm’t Co., L.P. v. Everest Midwest Licensee, L.L.C., 381 F.3d 1039, 1045 (10th Cir. 2004) 
(applying Kansas law in telecommunications contract dispute and relying on section 207 of the 
Restatement to support a contract interpretation that favored the public interest); Sachtjen v. Am. 
Family Mut. Ins. Co., 49 P.3d 1146, 1150 & n.7 (Colo. 2002) (in an insurance context, a meaning 
that supports the public interest is preferred).   
  In  Classen v. Fed. Land Bank of Wichita, 617 P.2d 1255 (1980), the Kansas Supreme Court 
recognized its duty to consider the public policy against waste in interpreting oil and gas 
instruments:  
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V. THE MARKETABLE PRODUCT RULE VIOLATES THE PUBLIC POLICY 
AGAINST WASTE 
Nevertheless, courts adopting the Marketable Product Rule have 
uniformly failed in their responsibility to enforce the public policy 
against waste, finding ambiguity where it need not be found, and crafting 
a solution that promotes physical waste of natural gas resources.190  
Waste results from operation of the habendum clause in the underlying 
oil and gas lease, which establishes the duration of the lease.  A typical 
habendum clause provides for a fixed term of anywhere from a few 
months to several years, with the possibility of indefinite duration for “as 
long thereafter as oil or gas is produced in paying quantities.”191  “Paying 
quantities” is generally defined as oil or gas production “sufficient to 
yield a return in excess of operating costs,” without regard to drilling and 
other capital costs, and even though “the undertaking considered as a 
whole may ultimately result in a loss.”192 
                                                          
It is now common knowledge that this tired old world of ours, and our country 
in particular, is faced with a frightening and progressive energy crisis due 
principally to a shortage of petroleum reserves.  This country cannot now, and 
will not in the foreseeable future be able to, produce even the minimum 
requirements of oil and gas needed to preserve our existence.  With every 
increase in production we suffer a corresponding decrease in our petroleum 
energy reserves.  Under these severe conditions we feel that it is incumbent on 
all persons, including this court, to assist in the preservation and conservation 
of our natural petroleum resources including production methods which will 
minimize waste. 
 Id. at 1262 (emphasis added).  Under that view, perhaps Sternberger would have been decided 
differently if the court had considered how its confirmation of the Marketable Product Rule in 
Kansas jurisprudence would lead to waste of limited hydrocarbon resources.   
 190.  Note that a few state legislatures have enacted statutes that essentially codify some form of 
the Marketable Product Rule, usually subject to certain express language in the governing oil and gas 
leases.  See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 324.61503b (West Supp. 2014); NEV. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 522.115.1(b), 3 (West Supp. 2014); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 30-5-304(a)(ii), (vi) (West 2007).  
While these types of provisions cut against a state’s public policy regarding waste, the balancing of 
such policy objectives is inherently a function of the legislature, and it is the prerogative of that 
body, rather than the judiciary, to make such exceptions.  See supra notes 187–188 and 
accompanying text. 
 191.  Wellman v. Energy Res., Inc., 557 S.E.2d 254, 260 n.2 (W. Va. 2001) (quotation omitted); 
see also Levin v. Maw Oil & Gas, LLC, 234 P.3d 805, 809 (Kan. 2010); Pack v. Santa Fe Minerals, 
869 P.2d 323, 326 (Okla. 1994). Even if the habendum clause omits the express reference to “paying 
quantities,” such a requirement is generally presumed.  See, e.g., Pray v. Premier Petrol., Inc., 662 
P.2d 255, 257 (Kan. 1983). 
 192.  MARTIN & KRAMER, supra note 11, at 821; see also Reese Enters., Inc. v. Lawson, 553 
P.2d 885, 895 (Kan. 1976) (“It is generally accepted that the phrase ‘in paying quantities’ in the 
‘thereafter’ provision (extension clause) of an oil and gas lease’s habendum clause means production 
of quantities of oil or gas sufficient to yield a profit to the lessee over operating expenses, even 
though the drilling costs, or equipping costs, are never recovered, and even though the undertaking 
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A paying quantities analysis begins with the revenues derived from 
the contractual working interest under the original lease, with no 
reduction for any outstanding overriding royalty interests or other 
payments out of the lessee’s share of production.193  From that revenue 
stream, deductions are taken for the direct costs of production.194  Direct 
costs generally include costs or expenses for labor, taxes, electricity, fuel, 
and other items incurred to produce and market hydrocarbons from the 
leased premises.195 
When gas is sold off the leased premises, the lessee’s revenue stream 
is also reduced by the post-production costs incurred to gather, treat, and 
transport the gas to the point of sale.196  In non-Marketable Product Rule 
jurisdictions, the lessor bears its proportionate share of those post-
production costs.  However, in Marketable Product Rule states, the 
lessee’s share of production revenue is further burdened with the lessor’s 
share of post-production costs from the wellhead to the point where the 
gas is placed in marketable condition, or even further to a marketable 
location (for Colorado) or the ultimate point of sale (for West Virginia).  
Since this shifting of post-production costs is not accompanied by any 
increase in the lessee’s production revenue, in most cases the 
unavoidable result is that the underlying lease will terminate due to 
cessation of production in paying quantities at an earlier point in time, 
and with less overall recovery of natural gas, than if the lessor had been 
required to bear its share of post-production costs.197 
                                                          
as a whole may thus result in a loss to the lessee.”); Smith v. Marshall Oil Corp., 85 P.3d 830, 833 
(Okla. 2004) (supporting the idea that “paying quantities” means producing enough oil or gas to 
provide a profit in excess of the operating expenses). 
 193.  Reese Enters., 553 P.2d at 898; Transp. Oil Co. v. Exeter Oil Co., 191 P.2d 129, 133–34 
(Cal. Ct. App. 1948); Clifton v. Koontz, 325 S.W.2d 684, 693 (Tex. 1959).  For a thorough treatment 
of the paying quantities analysis, see Douglas H. Gross, Meaning of “Paying Quantities” in Oil and 
Gas Lease, 43 A.L.R.3d 8 (Supp. 2014). 
 194.  Reese Enters., 553 P.2d at 898; see also Whitaker v. Texaco, Inc., 283 F.2d 169, 176 (10th 
Cir. 1960) (applying Oklahoma law); Lowther Oil Co. v. Miller-Sibley Oil Co., 44 S.E. 433, 507–08 
(W. Va. 1903). 
 195.  See generally Gross, supra note 193, § 6. 
 196.  Reese Enters., 553 P.2d at 898 (paying quantities analysis includes deduction of costs to 
market gas); Clifton, 325 S.W.2d at 691; Barbour, Stedman & Co. v. Tompkins, 93 S.E. 1038, 1040 
(W. Va. 1917) (“If the quantity be sufficient to warrant the use of the gas in the market, and the 
income therefrom is in excess of the actual marketing cost, the production satisfies the term ‘in 
paying quantities.’”). 
 197.  See JOHN S. LOWE et al., CASES AND MATERIALS ON OIL AND GAS LAW 341 (quoting W.L. 
SUMMERS, THE LAW OF OIL AND GAS § 589B (John S. Lowe update ed.) (Version 1954 and 
Thomson 2007)) (“One may also argue that adopting a rule that the implied covenant to market 
requires the lessee to pay all expenses of developing a commercial product is bad policy.  Adoption 
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This point can be illustrated with a simple example.  Assume a gas 
lease with a 25% lessor’s royalty, and total revenue attributable to the 
contractual working interest of $20,000 over the relevant period of time. 
Also assume that direct costs of production to get the gas to the surface 
are $10,000; post-production costs from the wellhead to the point of sale 
are $10,000; and the gas first reaches “marketable condition” at the point 
of sale.  In a non-Marketable Product Rule state, the lessee bears all costs 
of production, but the lessor bears its proportionate share of post-
production costs.  In this example, the lessor would bear 25% of the 
$10,000 in post-production costs, leaving the lessee responsible for the 
remaining expenses of $10,000 in production costs and $7,500 in post-
production costs.  That yields a profit to the lessee of $2,500 ($20,000 in 
revenue, less $17,500 in costs), and the lease is maintained by production 
in paying quantities. 
Considering that same scenario in a Marketable Product Rule state, 
the lessee bears all production and post-production costs.  Thus the lessee 
is responsible for $10,000 in production costs and all $10,000 in post-
production costs, which wipes out the lessee’s profit.  Since production 
in paying quantities has ceased, absent some other lease savings 
provision, the lease generally terminates.198  Since it may be observed 
that a lessor rarely takes the actions necessary to qualify under state law 
to become the operator and take over operation of the lease,199 the wells 
                                                          
of such a rule is likely to mean that wells will be plugged and abandoned sooner than they would 
otherwise.”).  
 198.  Although there is some distinction among the Marketable Product Rule states regarding 
application of the lease’s habendum clause upon cessation of production in paying quantities, the 
difference generally turns on whether the law requires actual production in paying quantities, or the 
capability to produce in paying quantities.  See Davis v. Cramer, 837 P.2d 218, 222 (Colo. Ct. App. 
1992) (habendum clause satisfied by discovery of commercial quantities of hydrocarbons); Pack v. 
Santa Fe Minerals, 869 P.2d 323, 327 (Okla. 1994) (capability of production in paying quantities 
satisfies habendum clause); Goodwin v. Wright, 255 S.E.2d 924, 925–26 (W. Va. 1979) (production 
in paying quantities, or diligent efforts to secure same, required to satisfy habendum clause).  
Regardless of whether a state looks to actual production or capability of production in evaluating 
operation of the habendum clause, the same result ensues when the issue is not lack of physical 
production, but rather the resulting economics; when the Marketable Product Rule accelerates the 
point of unprofitable production, the lease is neither actually producing, nor capable of producing, in 
paying quantities. 
 199.  This is largely an empirical observation; however, as one metric by which this proposition 
may be evaluated, consider that a review of the list of active oil and gas operators in Kansas reveals 
out of over 2,400 operators, less than 400 are individuals, family-related trusts, or similar entities 
that appear (from the name) to potentially be lessors who took over wells on their property.  See 
Kansas Oil Operators, KANSAS CORPORATION COMMISSION, http://www.kcc.state.ks.us 
/conservation/oil_license.cgi (last visited Oct. 24, 2014) (follow “list of active operators only” 
hyperlink).  Obviously, this number could be lower than actual to the extent lessors took over 
operations under an entity name; and the number could be too high to the extent that a number of the 
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on the lease are abandoned, leaving in the ground potentially substantial 
quantities of natural gas that would have been recovered had the 
Marketable Product Rule not been applied.200 
Other than the lessors, everyone suffers under the Marketable 
Product Rule.  The lessees clearly suffer by being burdened with 
additional costs that were not bargained for under the leases, and through 
the loss of additional reserves that would have been economically 
recoverable in a non-Marketable Product Rule jurisdiction.  The public 
as a whole suffers when those natural gas reserves, prematurely 
abandoned under the Marketable Product Rule, never make it to market, 
thereby resulting in the potential for higher prices due to reduced supply, 
higher trade imbalances and dependence on less reliable foreign energy 
supplies due to the need to import replacement energy sources, and 
perhaps the use of less environmentally friendly sources of energy to 
replace those lost reserves.201  In a rising market, even the lessors may 
suffer loss; if the Marketable Product Rule triggers premature lease 
termination and abandonment, the lessors lose the opportunity to receive 
royalty on the otherwise recoverable gas.  If the price for natural gas rises 
significantly thereafter, it is certainly conceivable that the lessors might 
have received more royalty overall by bearing their share of post-
                                                          
listed individuals are simply operators, rather than lessors who took over their own operations.  In 
any event, it is the order of magnitude of the number that is most informative.  The Kansas 
Geological Survey shows that, as of August 7, 2014, there were almost 100,000 producing oil and 
gas wells in Kansas.  See Oil and Gas Well Statistics for Kansas, KANSAS GEOLOGICAL SURVEY,  
http://www.kgs.ku.edu/PRS/wellStats.html (last visited Oct. 24, 2014).  Assuming that 400 is an 
even remotely accurate estimate of the number of former lessors who took over wells, and assuming 
the average lease may have a handful of unplugged, potentially productive wells thereon, the data 
supports the notion that it is a rarity that a lessor operates wells under any circumstances. 
 200.  In Royalty Jurisprudence: A Tale Of Two States, Professor David Pierce analyzes the 
glaring disparities between Texas’ plain-language approach to “at the well” gas royalty provisions 
and Colorado’s continual expansion of its Marketable Product Rule jurisprudence when applied to 
the same royalty language.  Pierce, supra note 140.  Professor Pierce notes that the Marketable 
Product Rule battles are a classic example of the conflict predicted by his “royalty value theorem,” 
id. at 358, which states, “When compensation under a contract is based upon a set percentage of the 
value of something, there will be a tendency by each party to either minimize or maximize the 
value.”  Id. at 352.   
  Along with his royalty value theorem analysis, Professor Pierce also postulated that royalty 
litigation, like that involved in Marketable Product Rule disputes, is a “zero-sum game,” id. at 348-
49, in which the courts engage in “a re-slicing of the finite production pie.”  Id. at 349.  While that 
may sometimes be the case, this author suggests that any time the dispute has the potential to result 
in a reduction in the lessee’s production revenue, or an increase in the lessee’s share of production or 
post-production costs, the resulting acceleration of lease termination due to premature cessation of 
production in paying quantities results in a shrinking pie.  Thus, the contest is not always a zero-sum 
game, but sometimes one which results in a net negative overall, with the only question being 
whether the lessee bears all the loss, or whether the lessor also suffers from his self-inflicted wounds. 
 201.   See Burns, supra note 173, at 624. 
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production costs and receiving royalty on substantially more production, 
than they would by shifting their post-production costs to the lessee and 
producing less.  And finally, the Marketable Product Rule imposes a 
burden on future oil and gas lessors in that, all other things being equal, a 
potential lessee can afford to offer a higher royalty to a lessor in a non-
Marketable Product Rule jurisdiction.  While this burden is difficult to 
quantify, it is intuitive that a lessee entering a Marketable Product Rule 
state will have to figure the additional post-production costs into its 
economics when determining the royalty burden it is willing to bear to 
obtain leases.  Accordingly, the Marketable Product Rule is a regressive 
doctrine that benefits past generations of lessors by essentially rewriting 
more favorable lease terms on their behalf, while shifting the costs to 
lessees, future lessors, and the general public. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The Marketable Product Rule represents an unnecessary 
reinterpretation of established oil and gas lease language, the result of 
which promotes waste of natural gas resources in violation of the public 
policy of every state that has adopted the Rule.  To correct this 
aberration, Marketable Product Rule courts need to be more circumspect 
about the overall consequences of their doctrine.  Crafted with a myopic 
view toward protecting weak landowners from the overreaching of “Big 
Oil,” the Marketable Product Rule reflects a paternalistic solution to a 
largely bygone era when landowners lacked ready access to legal 
expertise on oil and gas leasing.  While the oil and gas industry has by no 
means been purged of its inherent self-interest, nor has it been 
immunized against sharp practices, the abundant availability of legal 
services to advise potential lessors in an oil and gas transaction weighs 
heavily against the continued role of the courts as post-hoc advocates for 
the unwitting landowner.  Moreover, there is nothing inherently sinister 
or misleading about language that values royalty “at the well;” on the 
contrary, despite the Marketable Product Rule courts’ inability to 
understand that phrase, even the casual reader will probably get the idea 
that a royalty clause that values royalty “at the well” might mean that the 
value of the lessor’s royalty will be determined at the well. 
Instead of fixating on the lessor, courts need to consider the broader 
public policies implicated by their decisions.  An industry that is critical 
to the economic security of this country has been built on the well-
established foundation that certain common royalty provisions yield 
predictable results; but after half a century or more of predictability, the 
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Marketable Product Rule has injected extraordinary uncertainty into the 
interpretation of contracts on which many have staked their livelihood, 
and essentially turned unsuspecting lessees into guarantors of the quality 
of gas produced from their leases.  Prior to the adoption of the 
Marketable Product Rule, royalty clause jurisprudence was generally 
harmonized with the states’ public policies against waste.  However, the 
Rule itself frustrates those polices by promoting waste of natural gas 
resources.  This in turn denies the public important quantities of one of 
the most environmentally friendly fossil fuel resources, as well as an 
abundant alternative to oil imported from politically hostile or unstable 
parts of the world.  Finally, the Marketable Product Rule provides a 
windfall to prior generations of lessors at the expense of future lessors, 
who must bear the burden of reduced royalty percentages in comparison 
to lessors in non-Marketable Product Rule states, as lessees adjust their 
leasehold economics to account for the added burdens and uncertainties 
imposed under the Rule. 
Rather than engage in the linguistic gymnastics required to conclude 
that “at the well” does not mean “at the well,” and use implied covenants 
to improperly negate express lease language, Marketable Product Rule 
courts need to revisit the fundamentals of contract interpretation and their 
own historical jurisprudence on the proper role of covenants implied in 
fact to reign in the unprincipled consequences of the Rule.  These courts 
would do well to consider their role in supporting the public policy 
against waste articulated by their respective legislatures, and recognize 
that by promoting the premature abandonment of otherwise recoverable 
hydrocarbon reserves, the Marketable Product Rule inflicts harm on 
lessees, many lessors, and the public as a whole. 
 
